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The	Effect	That	State	and	Federal	Housing	Policies	Have	
on	Vehicle	Miles	of	Travel	
EXECUTIVE	SUMMARY	
This	report	examines	the	ability	of	existing	and	proposed	affordable	housing	policies	to	align	
with	sustainable	transportation	goals	in	California.		First,	we	compare	the	ability	of	Low	Income	
Housing	Tax	Credit	(LIHTC),	Redevelopment	and	inclusionary	funded	projects	to	locate	in	
neighborhoods	with	transit	access	to	employment	versus	market	rate	production	in	the	same	
period.		We	find	tax	credit	funded	units	outperform	market	rate	production	with	respect	to	job	
accessibility	via	transit,	and	we	attribute	this	to	the	scoring	criteria	of	California’s	tax	credit	
allocating	body,	the	Tax	Credit	Allocation	Committee	(TCAC).		However,	we	find	this	may	have	
come	at	the	cost	of	concentrating	new	affordable	housing	in	areas	with	higher	poverty	rates.			
At	the	federal	level,	we	measure	how	a	change	in	the	determination	of	maximum	payouts	for	
Section	8	housing	vouchers,	known	as	Fair	Market	Rents	(FMRs),	alters	the	ability	of	voucher	
holders	to	access	transit	and	jobs	rich	neighborhoods.		The	results	show	that	changing	to	“Small	
Area”	FMRs,	which	are	determined	at	the	ZIP	code	scale,	dramatically	improves	voucher	
holders’	access	to	jobs	rich	neighborhoods.	This	benefit	comes	at	the	cost	of	nearly	eliminating	
voucher	accessibility	in	neighborhoods	that	are	currently	accessible.		And	finally,	at	the	state	
level,	an	analysis	is	conducted	to	determine	if	California’s	emphasis	on	promoting	affordable	
housing	in	transit	and	jobs	rich	neighborhoods	is	increasing	the	cost	of	affordable	housing	
development.			The	modeling	results	indicate	that	affordable	housing	near	transit	stops	is	not	
significantly	more	expensive,	but	that	costs	increase	slightly	for	projects	in	jobs	rich	
neighborhoods.		Participation	in	the	state’s	Transit	Oriented	Development	(TOD)	housing	
program	does	not	significantly	impact	costs.		The	results	of	this	research	are	intended	to	inform	
policy	makers	at	every	level	of	government	on	how	best	to	continue	to	integrate	transportation	
and	housing	policies	without	sacrificing	the	primary	purpose	of	our	affordable	housing	policies:	
to	house	people.		
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Introduction	
Integrating	housing	and	transportation	planning	is	a	critical	component	of	addressing	emissions	
from	the	transportation	sector	over	the	long	term.		Spatial	imbalances	between	the	locations	of	
jobs	and	housing,	for	example,	contribute	to	dramatically	longer	commute	times	and	commute	
challenges	for	growing	regions	(1,	2).		The	proximity	of	housing	to	residents’	destinations	and	its	
impact	on	the	ability	of	residents’	to	access	amenities	without	a	car	can	have	a	critical	impact	
on	travel	behavior	(3,	4).	
Yet	only	recently	has	the	integration	of	housing	and	transportation	policy	become	a	major	focus	
of	state	and	federal	governments.		In	California,	the	passage	of	SB	375	in	2008	was	hailed	as	
major	landmark	in	this	trend;	the	law	requires	the	state’s	metropolitan	planning	organizations	
(MPOs)	to	include	a	“sustainable	communities	strategy”	as	part	of	their	regional	transportation	
plans	(5).		Under	SB	375,	these	plans	are	intended	to	better	link	housing	and	transportation	to	
reduce	vehicle	miles	traveled	(VMT),	ultimately	reducing	carbon	emissions	from	transportation.		
At	the	federal	level,	the	Obama	administration	ushered	in	a	series	of	policies	and	programs	
aimed	at	promoting	“sustainable	communities.”	This	effort	includes	offering	planning	grants	for	
integrating	transportation	and	housing	while	revamping	the	HOPE	VI	program	into	the	more	
sustainable-transportation	oriented	Choice	Neighborhoods	Initiative	(6,	7).		The	Obama	
administration	also	introduced	new	competitive	criteria	to	promote	transit	access	in	the	
Section	811	and	202	programs,	which	finance	supportive	housing	and	senior	affordable	housing	
respectively	(8,	9).		
This	emerging	set	of	transportation	and	housing	policies	is	rooted	in	the	understanding	that	
land	use	exhibits	a	significant	impact	on	travel	behavior.			Early	researchers	struggled	to	
separate	the	effects	of	land	use	on	travel	behavior	from	the	propensity	of	individuals	to	self-
select	into	the	kinds	of	neighborhoods	which	would	allow	them	to	travel	as	they	please	(10,	11).		
Subsequent	studies	accounting	for	self-selection	still	find	that	land	use	plays	a	critical	role	(12,	
13).		And	the	latest	set	of	studies,	which	seeks	to	address	self-selection	and	the	spatial	issues	in	
modeling	travel	behavior,	find	the	existing	literature	may	be	greatly	underestimating	the	
importance	of	land	use	in	predicting	travel	behavior	(14,	15).	Regardless	of	the	effect	size,	
policy	makers	have	already	begun	taking	action.	
Integrating	housing	with	transportation	and	land	use	planning	goals	generally	follows	two	
overarching	approaches:	increasing	the	proximity	of	new	housing	to	employment	and	other	
destinations,	and	increasing	housing	production	along	rail	lines,	commonly	referred	to	as	
transit-oriented	development	(TOD).		For	policy	evaluation,	these	two	approaches	require	the	
utilization	of	different	planning	metrics	to	evaluate	success.		Focusing	on	increasing	the	
proximity	of	new	housing	to	employment	and	other	destinations	is	generally	aimed	at	relieving	
jobs-housing	imbalances	(2,	16).		Traditional	jobs-housing	metrics,	however,	may	not	reflect	the	
job	accessibility	of	low	wage	or	low	skill	households	that	are	intended	to	benefit	from	
affordable	housing:	the	jobs	they	can	access	will	exhibit	different	patterns	of	concentration	
across	space	than	other	high	wage	jobs	(17,	18).		Scholars	have	advanced	new	metrics	utilizing	
the	most	detailed	available	Census	data	to	measure	jobs-housing	“fit”,	the	balance	between	
low	wage	workers	and	jobs	accessible	to	low	wage	workers	within	a	given	geography	(1).			
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Measuring	the	success	of	transit-oriented	development	(TODs)	and	integrating	affordable	
housing	with	public	transit	systems	require	a	different	metric	for	evaluating	success.	Public	
agencies	are	increasingly	evaluating	housing	projects’	worthiness	based	on	proximity	to	fixed	
route	transit	stops	and	the	strength	of	the	multimodal	connectivity	between	those	stops	and	
surrounding	neighborhoods	(19,	20).			
Our	research	focuses	on	these	primary	metrics	to	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	current	and	
proposed	housing	policies	in	increasing	low	income	households’	access	to	communities	in	
which	they	can	reduce	their	vehicle	miles	traveled	(VMT).		We	answer	the	question:	how	are	
current	affordable	housing	policies,	programs	and	strategies	enabling	low	income	households	
served	by	these	programs	to	access	jobs	and	transit	rich	communities?	
Chapter	1	reviews	the	literature	on	links	between	affordable	housing	and	transportation	
policies.		Efforts	to	align	affordable	housing	with	transit,	job	and	amenity	access	are	almost	
exclusively	tied	to	state	and	federal	supply	side	affordable	housing	programs.		There	is	almost	
no	effort	by	policy	makers	to	align	demand	side	voucher	programs	with	transit	and	jobs	access,	
this	despite	a	rich	literature	indicating	that	public	transit	access	is	a	key	concern	of	voucher	
program	participants	when	searching	for	new	homes.	
Chapter	2	examines	the	ability	of	affordable	housing	programs	to	outperform	new	market	rate	
housing	development	with	respect	to	placing	housing	near	medical	facilities,	public	
transportation,	grocery	stores	and	good	schools.		We	find	affordable	housing	programs	
outperform	the	market	with	respect	to	transport	and	grocery	access,	but	not	schooling	or	
medical	facilities	generally.		Among	affordable	housing	for	seniors,	however,	senior	projects	
significantly	outperform	market	rate	production	in	placing	new	units	near	grocery	stories	and	
public	transit.		
Chapter	3	explores	the	relationship	between	policy	scale	and	the	ability	of	demand	side	housing	
voucher	programs	to	enable	participants	to	access	jobs	and	transit	rich	communities.		HUD	is	
currently	exploring	changing	the	scale	at	which	housing	voucher	maximum	payouts	are	
calculated,	moving	from	the	metropolitan	area	scale	to	the	ZIP	code	scale.		Given	the	spatially-
auto-correlated	nature	of	rents,	we	hypothesize	that	the	use	of	finer	geographic	scales	in	
setting	voucher	maximums	increases	voucher	holders’	access	to	high	opportunity,	jobs	rich	
communities.		The	results	show	dramatic	improvements	in	voucher	access	to	jobs	rich	
neighborhoods	resulting	from	re-scaling	voucher	maximum	payouts	to	the	zipcode	level.				
Finally,	Chapter	4	takes	advantage	of	a	unique	data	set	of	affordable	housing	project	budgets	to	
examine	the	effect	proximity	to	rail	stations,	job	access	and	participation	in	the	state	of	
California’s	TOD	program	on	the	per	unit	cost	of	affordable	housing	development.		No	
significant	effects	are	found,	with	the	exception	of	jobs	housing	balance.	We	find	a	confluence	
of	other	factors,	including	wage	requirements,	underground	parking	and	the	scale	of	projects	
are	more	significant	drivers	of	affordable	housing	development	costs.	
The	results	in	these	chapters	will	assist	affordable	housing	policy	makers	at	the	local,	regional,	
state	and	federal	levels	in	identifying	what	levers	they	have	to	increase	affordable	housing	in	
high	opportunity,	jobs-rich	neighborhoods.	The	research	also	addresses	a	number	of	important	
gaps	in	current	research.	Chapter	3	offers	major	insights	on	the	potential	for	HUD’s	proposed	
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“Small	Area	Fair	Market	Rents”	to	transform	the	effectiveness	of	the	Section	8	voucher	
program.		The	last	chapter	on	affordable	housing	costs	also	holds	implications	for	policy	making	
beyond	the	issue	of	transit	access	for	affordable	housing.		Several	states	have	conducted	
analysis	evaluating	cost-drivers	in	affordable	housing	production	(21,	22).		Our	results	expand	
on	these	efforts	and	offer	new	insights	into	what	is,	and	what	is	not	increasing	the	cost	of	tax	
credit	financed	affordable	housing.		
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Chapter	1:	Literature	Review	
With	the	passage	of	California	Senate	Bill	375	(SB	375),	California’s	regions	are	beginning	to	at	
least	attempt	coordinated	planning	of	housing	and	transportation	(5).		However,	moving	from	
integrating	planning	to	actual	built	communities	that	reflect	the	integrating	planning	requires	
sophisticated	understanding	of	the	mechanisms	through	which	housing	markets	and	
transportation	systems	endogenously	drive	each	other.		A	large	body	of	literature	concerning	
the	role	of	transportation	infrastructure	in	inducing	land-use	change	already	exists	(23–25).		
This	paper	flips	the	topic	around,	tying	together	the	theoretical	mechanisms	through	which	
housing	policies	may	help	induce	shifts	in	residents’	travel	behavior.				The	paper	is	limited	to	
the	realm	of	affordable	housing	policy,	the	most	significant	arena	wherein	government	
intervenes	in	housing	markets	besides	monetary	and	tax	policy.		We	document	significant	need	
for	research	on	whether	or	not	the	many	spatially	oriented	and	transportation-specific	
elements	present	in	a	wide	array	of	affordable	housing	policies	and	programs	have	any	effect	at	
all	on	residents’	travel	patterns.		We	also	call	for	research	that	examines	the	costs	that	these	
transportation	approaches	may	have	on	affordable	housing	programs.			
	
	Based	on	our	review	of	the	literature,	we	categorize	the	policies,	incentives	and	elements	of	
housing	programs	which	may	alter	residents’	transport	options	and	preferences	using	two	
categories	of	mechanisms	through	which	we	hypothesize	they	are	most	likely	to	impact	
residents	travel	behavior.		The	first	group	fall	under	the	proximity	mechanism.	These	are	
policies	or	programs	that	increase	the	proximity	of	affordable	housing	to	key	travel	
destinations.	The	second	group	falls	into	what	we	will	refer	to	as	the	infrastructure	mechanism;	
these	programs	and	policies	tie	new	affordable	housing	to	multimodal	infrastructure	
development.	The	mechanisms	are	detailed	below:	
• Proximity	Mechanism.		These	housing	policies,	programs	and	incentives	increase	
housing	construction	near	key	travel	destinations,	regardless	of	modal	infrastructure	
considerations.		Theoretically,	VMT	declines	as	residents’	trip	lengths	are	shortened	
and	mode	shifts	to	active	travel	occur.		This	category	can	also	include	land	use	
decisions	that	prevent	or	constrain	the	construction	of	new	affordable	housing	when	
the	housing	is	too	far	away	from	existing	amenities.	These	policies	might	include	
requirements,	for	example,	that	new	affordable	housing	be	built	in	low-poverty,	jobs	
rich	communities.		The	most	common	focus	of	these	policies	is	on	proximity	to	jobs,	
and	thus	is	concerned	with	improving	jobs-housing	balance	or,	in	the	case	of	access	to	
low-wage	work,	alleviating	spatial	mismatch.		These	policies	are	primarily	
implemented	at	the	state,	local	and	regional	scale.		
• Infrastructure	Mechanism.		This	set	of	policies	ties	housing	development	to	the	
availability	of	transportation	infrastructure	(usually	transit),	or	links	the	financing	of	
new	affordable	housing	to	investments	in	non-auto	transportation	modes.		These	
policies	can	influence	VMT	by	altering	residents’	mode	of	travel.		This	category	
encompasses	efforts	to	concentrate	housing	development	in	transit-rich	and	walking	
and	cycling	friendly	communities	and	can	include	policies	that	reduce	affordable	
housing	projects	commitments	to	automobile	infrastructure	like	parking.		Policies	
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impacting	VMT	through	the	infrastructure	mechanism	can	be	found	at	every	scale	of	
government	from	local	zoning	incentives	to	the	federal	redevelopment	programs.	
	
This	review	examines	affordable	housing	policies	hypothesized	to	impact	VMT	through	each	of	
the	two	mechanisms	by	the	scales	at	which	they	are	implemented:	national,	state,	regional	and	
local	government.		We	discuss	the	policies,	their	intent,	and	highlight	evidence	of	their	impact	
on	vehicle	miles	traveled,	noting	gaps	in	our	understanding.		Where	evident,	the	financial	costs	
of	these	policies	and	their	cost-effectiveness	relative	to	other	housing	policies	are	reviewed.			
Proximity	Mechanism	
Housing	policies	designed	to	decrease	VMT	through	proximity	do	so	by	reducing	the	distance	
between	housing	and	households’	destinations,	including	work,	shopping,	school	and	public	
services.		Practically	speaking,	this	often	takes	the	form	of	reducing	jobs-housing	imbalance,	
which	has	been	identified	as	being	strongly	associated	with	what	scholars	term	“excess	
commuting”	(2,	26).	The	imbalance	of	low	wage	jobs	to	affordable	housing	is	strongly	
associated	with	longer	commute	distances	among	low	wage	workers	(1).			Although	jobs-
housing	balances	has	been	a	stalwart	metric	in	transportation	planning,	some	have	argued	that	
the	jobs-housing	balance	may	attain	equilibrium	over	time,	thus	negating	the	need	for	the	
metric,	at	least	in	transportation,		(27)	and	that	regional	travel	demand	modeling	suggests	it	
may	be	easier	for	policy	to	steer	the	location	of	housing	than	jobs	(16,	28).			
Low	income	housing	policies	which	reduce	VMT	by	reducing	jobs-housing	imbalance	are	
specifically	addressing	spatial	mismatch,	a	problem	first	invoked	by	William	Julius	Wilson	to	
describe	the	mismatch	between	the	location	of	low-skilled	labor	in	urban	cores	and	the	growth	
of	low-wage	jobs	in	sprawling,	segregated	suburbs	(29).		Addressing	mismatch,	and	its	
associated	excess	commuting	has	potential	to	reduce	VMT	and	improve	quality	of	life	for	low	
income	households;	low	income	commuters	have	some	of	the	longest	commute	times	(30)	and	
commutes	time	are	also	increasing	the	fastest	among	low-income	commuters	(31).	
National	Policies	and	the	Proximity	Mechanism		
Federal	supply	side	housing	policies	may	exacerbate	the	spatial	mismatch	among	the	poor.	The	
largest	federal	supply	side	housing	program,	the	low	Income	Housing	Tax	Credit	(LIHTC)	
program	has	had	some	success	increasing	the	production	of	affordable	housing	in	the	suburbs,	
where	jobs	are	plentiful	(32).	But	Dawkins	finds	that	despite	prior	evidence	suggesting	the	
LIHTC	programs	are	spreading	affordable	housing	into	low-wage	jobs	rich	suburbs	(33),	the	
housing	is	still	systematically	concentrated	in	high	poverty	neighborhoods	and	high	poverty	
suburbs	relative	to	housing	stock	overall	(34).		Importantly,	these	units	may	not	be	locating	in	
areas	where	the	need	is	highest	(35).		Dawkins	and	both	Lang	attribute	this	to	the	added	
subsidy	given	to	units	in	“Qualified	Census	Tracts”	(DDAs).	These	are	low-income	and	high	
poverty	areas	which	the	Department	of	Housing	and	Urban	Development	(HUD)	offers	deeper	
subsidies	for	LHITC	funded	projects	(36).		Lang	argues	that	because	building	in	DDAs	offers	
greater	financial	reward,	developers	choose	to	concentrate	tax	credit	developments	in	those	
tracts—despite	their	high	poverty	rates	(37).		The	QCT	and	DDA	are	the	only	spatially-oriented	
aspects	of	the	LIHTC	program	that	are	set	at	the	federal	level.			
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Under	the	Obama	administration,	other	federal	housing	supply	side	programs,	such	as	Section	
202,	which	provides	housing	for	the	elderly,	and	Section	811,	which	provides	housing	for	the	
disabled,	began	prioritizing	proximity	to	amenities	and	transit	access	(38).		In	its	latest	funding	
rounds,	HUD	offered	projects	applying	for	Section	202	funding	the	opportunity	to	earn	up	to	15	
fifteen	points	(out	of	102)	for	project	accessibility;	seven	were	for	transit	service	and	eight	were	
for	proximity	to	amenities	(9).		In	contrast,	Section	811	applicants	could	win	ten	out	of	102	
points	on	these	criteria—five	for	transit	service	and	five	for	amenities	proximity	(8).		
Additionally,	HUD	offered	projects	in	both	programs	the	opportunity	to	win	5	Policy	Priority	
points,	4	of	which	could	be	won	by	implementing	sustainability	goals	or	demonstrating	projects	
would	be	LEED	certified	or	Green	Building	certified	by	the	National	Association	of	Home	
Builders,	essentially	double	counting	amenity	access	and	transit	service	scores	as	these	appear	
both	directly	in	HUD	scoring	and	are	embedded	in	LEED	(9,	39).	Advocates	for	senior	affordable	
housing	anticipate	there	will	be	a	significant	need	for	additional	senior	housing	near	transit	in	
the	future—as	well	as	need	to	preserve	the	affordability	of	a		large	segment	of	the	senior	stock	
in	transit	rich	communities	(40).		Smaller	and	more	specified	HUD	housing	programs,	such	as	
the	Housing	Opportunities	for	Persons	With	AIDS	(HOPWA)	program,	do	not	include	such	
criteria	(41).		
The	research	on	the	efficacy	of	voucher	dispersion	as	a	means	of	addressing	spatial	mismatch	is	
mixed.	On	the	one	hand,	findings	suggest	that	when	residents	are	given	the	opportunity	to	
select	their	own	housing,	they	generally	find	housing	closer	to	their	work,	closer	to	public	
transit	and	in	lower-poverty	neighborhoods	when	compared	to	residents	in	project-based	
housing	(42,	43).		However,	there	is	also	evidence	that	public	transit	access	plays	a	minimal	role	
in	the	locational	decision	of	voucher	recipients	(35).		Generally,	the	Section	8	program	and	
other	demand	side	housing	voucher	programs	are	credited	with	enabling	residents	to	move	
into	communities	that	supply-side,	subsidized	housing	production	could	not	penetrate	(44).		
However,	it’s	fairly	clear	that	voucher	recipients	are	still	not	fully	integrated	into	high-
opportunity,	low	poverty	and	jobs-rich	communities	(45).			
HUD	is	now	experimenting	with	the	geographic	scale	at	which	the	maximum	amount	a	voucher	
pays	out	is	calculated.		These	Fair	Market	Rents	(FMRs)	are	currently	calculated	over	large	“HUD	
Market	Areas”	which	generally	align	with	county	or	metropolitan	statistical	area	boundaries.		
HUD	is	experimenting	with	“Small	Area	FMRs”	estimated	at	the	ZIP	code	scale	(46).	Preliminary	
evidence	out	of	Dallas,	where	ZIP	code	FMRs	were	first	implemented	in	response	to	a	lawsuit,	
suggests	adjusting	FMR	scales	may	significantly	affect	the	residential	geographic	mobility	of	
voucher	recipients	(47).			
Demand	side	policies,	like	vouchers,	have	been	shown	to	put	an	upward	pressure	on	rents	(48).		
In	the	short	run,	this	may	present	problems	for	maintaining	housing	affordability	in	transit	and	
jobs	rich	neighborhoods,	where	there	is	the	potential	for	increased	section	8	demand,	which	
results	upwards	bidding	of	rents.	In	the	long	run,	however,	this	could	prove	beneficial.	
Increases	in	the	rents	may	encourage	developers	to	produce	more	units	in	those	
neighborhoods	and	spur	existing	landlords	to	rehabilitate	existing	substandard	housing	units	
(49).			And	it	must	be	noted	that	repeated	analysis	find	that	demand	side	responses	such	
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housing	vouchers	are	significantly	more	cost	effective	than	supply-side	subsidies	for	new	
housing	construction	(50,	51).	
State	and	Regional	Policies	and	the	Proximity	Mechanism	
States	direct	affordable	housing	policy	through	their	Qualified	Allocation	Plans	(QAPs).		The	
annual	QAPs,	approved	by	the	federal	Department	of	Housing	and	Urban	Development	(HUD),	
establish	policy	for	the	disbursement	of	Low	Income	Housing	Tax	Credits.		The	QAPs	include	
scoring	criteria	for	competitive	tax	credits;	points	can	be	awarded	for	cost	efficiency,	local	
government	subsidy,	and	location.		Johnson	finds	that	from	2000	to	2010,	the	percent	of	states		
awarding	points	to	projects	for	proximity	to	multimodal	transportation	facilities	rose	from	3%	
to	31%	(52).		Proximity	to	other	amenities	such	as	parks,	libraries,	social	services,	banks,	
schools,	grocery	stores	and	medical	services	increased	from	16%	of	QAPs	to	56%	during	the	
same	period	(53).			
Most	affordable	housing	policy	is	motivated	primarily	by	poverty	de-concentration.	Johnson	
finds	QAP	policy	does	result	in	significantly	more	LIHTC	projects	in	lower	poverty	communities	
(52).				HUD’s	own	research	also	concludes	that	the	awarding	of	tax	credits	to	projects	outside	
areas	of	concentrated	poverty	and	near	more	amenities	in	QAPs	assists	in	poverty	de-
concentration	and	increases	access	to	amenities	(54).		Given	these	results,	we	can	speculate	
that	the	locational	criteria	used	in	scoring	for	competitive	tax	credit	funded	projects	contributes	
to	reducing	residents’	proximity	to	jobs	and	amenities	(and	by	extension	reduces	VMT),	but	
support	research	is	not	currently	present	in	the	literature.			
Beyond	the	QAPs,	states	can	also	utilize	land	use	policy	to	reduce	the	separation	between	
affordable	housing	and	suitable	employment.		Several	states	have	land	use	laws	designed	to	
constrain	local	jurisdictions’	exclusionary	zoning	practices.		Exclusionary	zoning	is	a	process	by	
which	cities	ensure	that	poor	or	low	income	families	cannot	afford	to	live	in	certain	
neighborhoods.	Most	communities	create	this	effect	by	establishing	minimum	lot	sizes,	or	only	
zoning	for	single-family	detached	units.		The	link	between	exclusionary	zoning	in	the	suburbs	
and	spatial	mismatch	between	low	wage	workers’	and	availability	of	low-wage	work	is	well	
established	in	the	literature	(55).		There	is	some	evidence	linking	exclusionary	zoning	to	spatial	
mismatch,	but	the	strength	of	the	association	between	exclusionary	zoning	in	explaining	spatial	
mismatch	relative	to	other	causes	is	unclear	(56).		However,	since	spatial	mismatch	is	linked	to	
excess	commuting	among	the	poor	(57),	policies	aimed	at	overriding	exclusionary	zoning	have	
the	potential	to	also	reduce	excess	commuting	and	thus,	VMT	among	low	income	households.		
In	one	of	the	most	extensive	reviews	of	anti-exclusionary	zoning	policies	to	date	Bratt	and	
Vladeck	(2014)	argue	that	these	policies	are	important	for	ensuring	that	affordable	housing	
construction	is	dispersed	across	regions	and	states.		Interestingly,	they	find	that	cities	that	
succeed	in	meeting	these	state	mandated	affordable	housing	benchmarks	tend	to	be	less	white,	
of	lower	incomes	and	have	less	total	housing	construction	relative	cities	less	successful	under	
identical	state	laws.		Successful	communities	under	anti-exclusionary	laws	are	also	likely	to	be	
cities	with	serious	jobs-housing	imbalance	(58).			There	is	limited	to	no	research	that	examines	
how	anti-exclusionary	zoning	policies	affect	the	cost	of	constructing	new	housing.		But	the	
relationship	a	relationship	exclusionary	practices	and	higher	housing	prices	exists	(59).						
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One	last	state	level	proximity	mechanism	is	density	bonuses.	States	can	offer	density	bonuses	
for	the	inclusion	of	affordable	housing	as	part	of	a	larger	development	project.	Density	bonuses	
have	been	found	to	increase	housing	production	in	already	dense,	centralized	communities	
(citation).	This	strategy	holds	promise	for	producing	housing	in	low-VMT	communities,	but	at	
the	cost	of	concentrating	new	affordable	housing	in	areas	with	higher	than	average	poverty	
rates	(60).			
Local	Government	Policies	and	the	Proximity	Mechanism		
Local	government	housing	policies	that	can	reduce	VMT	via	the	proximity	mechanism	are	
significant	in	that	they	can	enable	those	jurisdictions	with	severe	jobs-housing	imbalances	or	
shortages	of	affordable	housing	to	directly	specify	where	more	affordable	housing	can	be	built.		
This	sub-section	reviews	these	policies	and	their	benefits	for	VMT	reduction.		
Local	government	inclusionary	housing	mandates—a	requirement	that	some	percentage	of	a	
new	residential	development	contain	affordable	housing	or	the	developer	must	pay	an	in-lieu	
fee—are	the	most	direct	means	of	ensuring	housing	at	all	income	levels	is	produced	in	every	
community.				Scholars	have	traditionally	had	trouble	evaluating	these	programs;	requirements	
can	vary	by	city	and	the	option	for	developments	to	pay	into	an	affordable	housing	fund	in-lieu	
of	including	affordable	units	is	also	allowed	in	some	cities	(61,	62).		Despite	the	difficulty	in	
evaluating	these	programs,	there	are	some	points	of	interests	that	have	emerged	from	the	
research.	First,	inclusionary	housing	policies	may	also	serve	to	shore	up	affordable	housing	
production	in	cities	that	have	historically	had	more	trouble	producing	housing	and	have	state	
housing	mandates	(63).			
In	theory,	if	most	cities	have	robust	inclusionary	housing	laws,	then	inclusionary-based	
affordable	unit	production	should	at	least	parallel	market	rate	production	with	respect	to	the	
intra-regional	spatial	distribution	of	new	units.		The	theoretical	cost	of	having	these	programs	is	
that	by	reducing	developer	profits	through	forcing	a	subsidy—the	inclusionary	units—the	policy	
ends	up	hamper	overall	housing	production,	although	very	little	evidence	of	this	has	yet	to	be	
found	(Rosen,	2004).		Later	research	found	that	evidence	of	price	increases	from	inclusionary	
housing	is	spuriously	driven	by	the	fact	that	cities	with	fast	rising	prices	are	those	which	
implement	these	policies	(e.g.,	the	research	may	suffer	from	selection	bias)	(64).		Coordination	
of	inclusionary	zoning	policies	across	localities	in	the	same	region	holds	greater	promise	of	
evenly	distributing	inclusionary-zoning	developed	affordable	sites	(65).		The	importance	of	
regional	coordination	of	such	policies	seems	obvious;	developers	respond	to	intra-regional	
variation	in	inclusionary-zoning	requirements	by	concentrating	construction	in	communities	
where	the	requirements	are	least	expensive.			
Cities	and	counties	also	control	land	use	and	zoning,	providing	the	opportunity	for	additional	
affordable	housing	through	a	milieu	of	land	use	and	zoning	changes	that	increase	density	in	
jobs	and	amenity-rich	neighborhoods.		Zoning	to	enable	backyard	or	“granny	flat”	units	behind	
single	family	homes	can	boost	the	range	of	naturally	affordable	housing	(66),	especially	in	
transit-oriented	neighborhoods	(67).		Affordability	by	design—the	legalization	of	micro-units	or	
flats	with	shared	common	areas—offers	great	potential	in	providing	naturally	affordable	
housing	in	dense,	expensive	areas	with	close	proximities	to	amenities	and	jobs	(68).		However,	
this	frequently	requires	significant	overhaul	of	existing	zoning	and	regulatory	barriers	(69).		
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Cities	can	also	enable	the	reallocation	of	commercial	structures	to	residential	development,	
placing	new	housing	in	central	business	districts	with	immediate	proximity	to	employment	and	
services	(70).		Zoning	and	regulatory	changes	occurring	at	the	local	do	not	come	with	direct	
subsidizing	of	new	developments.		However,	there	is	no	systematic,	quantitative	evidence	
suggesting	this	array	of	policies	produces	affordable	housing	in	communities	that	would	
otherwise	not	be	built.	
Several	jurisdictions	in	California	also	charge	non-residential	developments	with	affordable	
housing	linkage	fees,	which	charge	new	employment	sites	on	a	per-square	foot	basis	to	fund	
affordable	housing	programs;	these	policies	are	primarily	designed	to	address	jobs-housing	
imbalances	(71,	72).		The	processes	for	estimating	linkage	fees	is	relatively	uniform,	drawing	
from	Nollan	v.	California	Coastal	Commission	and	Dolan	v.	City	of	Tigard	(73,	74).		But	there	is	
little	evidence	that	the	policy	reduces	the	production	of	commercial	development	(75).		In	the	
long	term,	linkage	fees	may	slow	commercial	development	in	urban	cores;	the	fees	can	
consume	developer	profits	during	downturns	(76).		
There	are	also	a	significant	array	of	zoning	practices,	including	relaxing	or	expanding	height	
restrictions,	limits	on	mixed-use	development,	setback	requirements,	lot	coverage	maximums,	
and/or	lot	size	minimums	and	maximums	(77).	These	practices	can	lower	the	cost	of	housing	
production	for	infill	development	for	both	affordable	and	market	rate	units,	increasing	the	
number	of	units	proximate	to	jobs	and	amenities	as	well	as	reducing	their	costs.		.		Or	put	
another	way,	cities	implementing	pro-infill	zoning	policies	can	assist	in	reducing	spatial-
mismatch	by	undoing	the	zoning	mechanisms	which	produced	exclusionary	zoning.		No	studies	
directly	link	the	cost	of	affordable	housing	production	and	the	density,	height	and	other	zoning	
limits,	but	economies	of	scale	in	housing	development	and	simulation	analysis	demonstrate	
these	policies	increase	both	the	cost	of	housing	development	and	the	cost	of	commuting	
limiting	projects’	and	cities’	compactness	(78,	79).	
Infrastructure	Mechanism		
Housing	policies	that	can	impact	VMT	through	infrastructure	mechanisms	do	so	by	directly	
linking	the	financing	of	affordable	housing	development	to	transit	or	active	mode	
infrastructure.		A	large	body	of	research	demonstrates	the	VMT	reductions	of	transit	oriented	
development	(12,	80–82).		There	is	less	research	directly	quantifying	the	impact	of	placing	
affordable	housing	in	transit-oriented	developments	(TODs)	on	residents	VMT,	noting	that	low	
income	residents	VMT	is	more	sensitive	to	being	in	a	TOD	(83).		Infrastructure	mechanisms	
function	by	inducing	mode	shift,	when	residents	shift	from	auto	to	transit,	walking	and	bicycling	
facilities	
Federal	Policies	and	the	Infrastructure	Mechanism	
The	Choice	Neighborhoods	Initiative	(CNI)	is	the	most	significant	advancement	of	federal	
affordable	housing	redevelopment	policy	in	the	last	decade.		The	predecessor	program	of	CNI,	
HOPE	VI,	redeveloped	dilapidated	public	housing	projects,	creating	better	designed	mixed-
income	communities,	but	this	came	at	the	cost:	tens	of	thousands	for	former	public	housing	
residents	were	displaced	(84).		The	new	CNI	program	provides	additional	financial	support	to	
again	rebuild	communities’	infrastructure	and	provide	enhanced	social	services	for	economic	
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revitalization	(6).		Choice	Neighborhood	projects	can	spend	up	to	15%	of	their	budgets	on	
Critical	Community	Improvements	(CCIs).		Several	projects	currently	underway	include	
improved	bicycle	and	pedestrian	facilities,	and	improved	transit	service	(85–87).		Despite	
requiring	considerable	federal	investment,	the	interventions	are	considered	significantly	less	
expensive	than	inaction	or	minor	rehabilitation	(88).			
Researchers	on	redevelopment	have	identified	quantifiable	metrics	by	which	CNI	could	be	
deemed	a	success;	only	one	of	the	metrics	is	associated	with	transportation:	increased	transit	
service	(7).		Given	some	of	the	major	accessibility	and	infrastructure	changes	soon	to	be	
underway	in	CNI	communities,	these	projects	also	warrant	further	study	as	they	represent	
natural	experiments	that	can	advance	our	understanding	of	how	new	infrastructure	influences	
travel	behavior.			
State	and	Regional	Policies	and	the	Infrastructure	Mechanism		
California	has	experience	producing	affordable	housing	proximate	to	major	transit	
infrastructure,	and	linking	housing	construction	with	investments	in	transit	and	bicycle	and	
pedestrian	facility	upgrades.		Advocates	with	Housing	California	have	documented	that	the	
state’s	Infill	Infrastructure	Grant	(IIG)	and	Transit	Oriented	Development	(TOD)	Grant	have	
helped	produce	over	12,000	affordable	and	market	rate	units	at	roughly	$36,000	per	units	in	
subsidy	(89).		This	analysis	does	not	consider	the	extent	to	which	such	subsidies	were	necessary	
to	ensure	housing	production,	or	if	units	funded	through	this	program	merely	functioned	to	
crowd	out	units	the	market	would	have	already	provided	for—as	some	have	suggested	the	
LIHTC	program	does	(90).			
There	is,	however,	reason	to	believe	that	the	subsidies	provided	by	the	IIG	and	TOD	grants	are	
necessary	to	at	least	ensure	the	provision	of	affordable	units	in	TOD	sites,	particularly	those	
built	along	fixed	route	rail	systems	fixed	route	transit	systems	increase	land	and	property	
values.		A	large	body	of	literature	suggests	that	adjacency	to	fixed	route	transit	can	command	
land	and	housing	price	increases	anywhere	from	a	1%	to	15%	(91–93).			While	this	literature	is	
mostly	concerned	with	adjacency	to	transit	systems	as	opposed	to	TOD	developments,	we	
would	expect	the	effect	of	transit	on	property	values	to	be	stronger	in	TODs	as	they	are	
designed	and	built	to	capitalize	on	transit	access	and	also	include	walkability	and	bike	ability	in	
their	designs	(94–96).	Even	the	process	of	planning	for	potential	transit	investments	and	rail	
expansions	can	trigger	property	value	increases	(97).		The	transit	premium	as	only	increased	
since	the	Great	Recession		(91,	98).			
Taken	holistically,	the	research	to	date	suggests	that	subsidizing	low	income	housing	in	transit	
oriented	developments	should	thus	be	roughly	1%	to	15%	more	expensive	than	subsidizing	low	
income	housing	elsewhere,	all	things	being	equal.		It’s	not	clear	if	the	additional	subsidies	
provided	by	the	TOD	and	IIG	programs	cover	or	exceed	this	cost.		If	these	programs	failed	to	
meet	the	additional	costs	(associated	with	increased	property	values),	then	developers	may	cut	
costs	elsewhere,	bargain	down	zoning	or	parking	requirements	with	cities,	or	sought	out	
additional	subsidies.		If	the	subsidy	exceeded	the	additional	need,	then	projects	taking	
advantage	of	these	programs	may	have	simply	drawn	less	subsidy	from	other	sources	they	
would	have	won	otherwise	or	experienced	cost	inflation.	
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California	has	also	introduced	its	own	program	for	affordable	housing	production	and	
rehabilitation	that	mimic’s	the	Choice	Neighborhood	Initiative.	The	new	program,	the	
Affordable	Housing	and	Sustainable	Communities	(AHSC)	program,	links	new	housing	with	
improved	green	infrastructure.		The	proposed	scoring	criteria	for	AHSC	projects,	and	
subsequent	pushback	from	various	stakeholders,	highlights	the		challenges	facing	policy	makers	
hoping	to	simultaneously	address	social	equity	and	environmental	sustainability	issues	.		As	of	
this	writing,	2016	draft	scoring	criteria	place	only	30	out	of	100	points	on		emissions	reductions	
and	cost-effectiveness,	while	rewarding	just	10	points	to	projects	for	depth	of	housing	
affordability	(e.g.	units	at	30%	of	area	median	income	versus	units	at	80%	of	area	median	
income)	(20).			
The	AHSC	is	a	good	program	for	evaluation	because	it	relies	on	a	specific,	uniform	and	
replicable	tool	to	estimate	the	emissions	reductions	of	affordable	housing	projects	based	on	
their	locations	and	attributes:	CalEEMod,	a	development	emissions	estimation	model.		
CalEEMod	is	not	a	VMT	estimator,	but	it	includes	estimation	of	VMT	produced	by	sites.		It	links	
project	costs	and	estimated	emissions	reductions,	and	can	be	applied	uniformly	to	projects	
funded	through	any	sources,	not	just	the	AHSC.		However,	CalEEMod	isn’t	really	set	up	to	
address	affordable	housing	and	some	advocates	have	noted	studies	suggest	the	software	may	
be	under-estimating	the	emissions	reductions	from	affordable	housing	commitments	in	
projects	(99).	
Finally,	a	few	ambitious	metropolitan	planning	organizations	(MPO),	which	are	responsible	for	
disbursing	transportation	dollars	at	the	regional	scale,	have	created	financial	incentives	to	
induce	development	of	affordable	housing	alongside	transit	and	transit	infrastructure	
improvement	programs.		The	San	Francisco	Bay	Area’s	Metropolitan	Transportation	
Commission’s	Housing	Incentive	Program	(HIP),	for	example,	provided	over	$7.3	million	dollars	
to	provide	set	per-bedroom	grants	to	housing	projects,	assisting	in	the	financing	of	nearly	5,000	
units	all	within	a	third	of	a	mile	of	a	fixed	route	transit	stop	with	service	intervals	of	15	minutes	
or	less	during	peak	commute	times	(100).	
Local	Policies	and	the	Infrastructure	Mechanism		
The	strongest	affordable	housing	production	tool	available	to	local	jurisdictions	is	the	abolition	
of	minimum	parking	requirements	for	housing	construction.		Evidence	from	New	York	suggests	
developers	generally	only	build	the	minimum	required	amount	of	parking,	and	that	parking	
minimums	correlate	negatively	with	distance	to	transit	(101).		In	Los	Angeles,	the	relaxing	of	
parking	requirements	has	played	a	critical	role	in	enabling	developers	to	construct	more	
housing	(102).	Shoup	has	long	argued	that	parking	requirements	artificially	raise	the	cost	of	
housing,	penalizing	car-free	households	with	higher	housing	costs	(103).		There	is	clear	
evidence	that	parking	availability	increases	auto	use	(104),	Activist	organizations	are	now	
working	with	developers	and	cities	to	enable	new	infill	developments	to	be	built	without	
arduous	minimum	parking	requirements	in	exchange	for	developers	purchasing	lifetime	transit	
passes	for	new	units	and	prioritizing	bicycle	parking,	among	other	things	(105).		However,	this	
approach	may	face	some	of	the	most	significant	road	blocks,	as	transportation	and	parking	
related	complaints	are	some	of	the	most	common	to	fuel	NIMBY	(not-in-my-backyard)	backlash	
against	affordable	housing	project	(106).		This	obstacle	is	strong	enough	that	California	had	to	
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pass	a	state	law	requiring	cities	to	allow	senior	and	special	needs	affordable	housing	projects	
meet	lower	minimum	parking	requirements	(107).		
Conclusions	
Nearly	all	policies	increasing	housing	in	TODs	are	supply	side.	Given	the	weight	of	the	evidence	
that	demand	side	programs	are	more	cost	effective	and	can	induce	a	supply	side	response,	
policy	makers	should	explore	offering	demand	side	policies	to	help	lower	income	households	
afford	TODs.		Policy	makers	should	also	consider	adjust	existing	demand	side	policies	to	account	
the	higher	cost	of	living	in	more	accessible	communities.		
Policies	which	increase	housing	proximity	to	destinations,	particularly	those	embedded	in	point	
systems	for	various	funding	programs,	are	not	sensitive	to	how	local	exclusionary	zoning	may	
be	constricting	the	number	of	projects	in	each	locality	that	can	successfully	compete	for	
funding.		Policy	makers	should	examine	how	this	dynamic	may	be	impacting	land	prices	of	
those	occasional	sites	that	possess	the	right	mix	of	proper	local	zoning	and	an	optimal	location	
for	winning	tax	credits	or	other	subsidies.		The	state’s	Regional	Housing	Needs	Allocation	
(RHNA)	has	a	proven	record	of	success,	it	should	form	the	basis	around	which	more	aggressive	
regional	housing	policies	can	be	established.	For	example,	the	state	or	an	MPO	could	be	given	
the	right	to	override	local	planning	decisions	on	sites	provided	in	adequate	site	inventories.	In	a	
case	where	such	a	site	is	infeasible	for	a	project	because	of	height	limits	or	other	rules	the	
developer	could	apply	directly	to	the	state	to	override	local	rules.			
New	Research	Directions	
New	research	needs	to	examine	if	the	locational	scoring	criteria	of	QAP	impacts	the	physical	
and	social	mobility	of	site	residents	and	if	so,	to	what	extent.		This	research	should	also	
compare	residents’	sites	to	the	proximity	of	their	previous	homes	to	the	same	set	of	amenities	
to	examine	which	programs	are	reducing	VMT	by	assisting	residential	transitions	into	more	
location	efficient	areas.		Scholars	should	explore	how	policy	variation	over	space	and	time	in	
LIHTC	project	scoring	criteria	contributes	to	different	transport	outcomes	among	project	
residents—and	what	costs,	both	financial	costs	and	the	loss	of	the	ability	to	utilize	housing	
policy	to	meet	other	social	goals.						
The	impact	of	the	RHNA	and	similar	programs	on	both	the	supply	of	affordable	housing	and	the	
cost	of	land	need	further	analysis.		The	individual	and	cumulative	impacts	of	various	aspects	of	
local	zoning,	from	height	limits	to	aesthetic	requirements	to	sustainability	requirements	on	the	
cost	of	building	housing	are	still	unaccounted	for.		How	these	costs	are	unevenly	forced	onto	
affordable	housing	development	across	our	regions	and	the	resulting	incentive	surface	they	
create	has	also	not	been	fully	charted.		
On	the	demand	size,	scholars	should	explore	the	role	of	policy	scale	in	predetermining	voucher	
eligibility,	particularly	the	scale	at	which	Fair	Market	Rents	for	Section	8	vouchers.		More	
importantly,	there	is	a	lack	of	understanding	of	how	the	many	spatially	oriented	housing	
policies	and	program	scoring	criteria	at	multiple	levels	of	government	synergistically	drive	
affordable	housing	development	into	some	areas	and	not	others.			
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Chapter	2:	The	Ability	of	Supply	Side	Programs	to	Penetrate	High	
Opportunity,	Jobs	and	Transit	Rich	Neighborhoods		
Constructing	affordable	housing	in	low-poverty,	jobs-rich	communities	has	been	a	priority	of	
state	and	federal	housing	policy	for	decades.		Scholars	generally	credit	the	Low	Income	Housing	
Tax	Credit	program	with	significantly	improving	the	locational	quality	of	new	affordable	housing	
compared	to	the	mega-projects	built	in	the	1950s	and	1960s	(33).		Very	little	research	compares	
the	locational	outcomes	of	affordable	housing	units	based	on	the	different	types	of	programs	
which	funded	them.		We	compare	the	locational	outcomes	of	units	funded	by	three	distinct	
types	of	programs	against	each	other	and	against	market	rate	units:	inclusionary	housing	units,	
redevelopment	supported	units	and	tax	credit	financed	units.		We	compare	how	these	
programs	vary	in	locational	outcomes	across	three	distinct	metropolitan	areas:	the	San	
Francisco	Bay	Area,	Greater	Sacramento,	and	San	Diego	County.		Data	is	drawn	from	the	
authors’	own	examination	of	multiple	different	planning	and	housing	financing	sources	and	
spans	the	years	from	2000	to	2010.			
With	respect	to	neighborhood	job	access,	we	find	units	funded	through	all	three	types	of	
programs	underperform	against	market	rate	units	overall.		We	find	they	perform	evenly	against	
market	rate	units	in	the	Bay	Area	and	actually	perform	better	than	market	rate	units	in	the	
Greater	Sacramento	area.		With	respect	to	neighborhood	poverty	rates,	all	three	types	of	
programs	perform	worse	than	market	rate	development.		With	respect	to	transit,	grocery	and	
medical	access,	tax	credit	funded	projects	outperform	other	units	built	by	programs	and	market	
rate	units	only	with	respect	to	transit	and	grocery	access,	suggesting	the	emphasis	on	location	
in	California’s	scoring	criteria	for	tax	credits	are	effective,	but	not	uniformly	so	(19).			
	 These	results	are	exploratory,	we	believe	they	offer	a	high	level	view	of	what	is	
happening	in	our	affordable	housing	programs	with	respect	to	location.		What	these	results	do	
not	do	is	offer	comprehensive	judgement	on	the	efficacy	of	these	programs,	as	the	benefits	of	
affordable	housing	extend	beyond	improving	access	to	high	opportunity	neighborhoods.		
Sometimes,	providing	someone	with	a	safe,	clean	habitable	and	affordable	home	can	improve	
their	physical	health	and	educational	and	employment	outcomes	regardless	of	location	(108).	
The	Probability	of	Affordable	Housing	Reaching	High	Opportunity	Areas		
The	affordable	housing	tax	credit	program	is	the	largest	supply-side	affordable	housing	
construction	program.		Meant	as	a	replacement	to	large	project-style	affordable	housing	built	
directly	by	the	federal	government,	tax	credit	financed	housing	is	developed	by	private	and	
non-profit	organizations	who	compete	for	tax	credits	that	they	can	sell	to	banks	to	raise	funding	
for	subsidized	housing.			While	the	tax	credit	program	may	out-perform	the	older	housing	
projects	(32),	it	is	still	concentrated	in	higher	poverty	communities	due	to	bonuses	in	the	tax	
credits	the	federal	government	awards	to	projects	located	in	specific	neighborhoods	(34).		In	a	
quest	to	maximize	returns,	developers	appear	to	be	systematically	locating	in	these	
communities	despite	their	higher	than	average	poverty	rates	(37).		Those	states	who	utilize	
their	tax	credit	allocation	plans	to	prioritize	building	in	low	poverty	neighborhoods,	however,	
appear	to	have	some	success	in	placing	sites	in	“high	opportunity”	neighborhoods	(53).		
However,	California’s	Tax	Credit	Allocation	Committee	(TCAC)	does	not	reward	projects	for	
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locating	in	low-poverty	neighborhoods,	making	it	unlikely	tax	credit	funded	projects	in	our	
sample	will	outperform	market	rate	units	with	respect	to	neighborhood	poverty	rates	(19).		
With	respect	to	transit	access,	however,	tax	credit	projects	may	outperform	market	rate	units,	
as	TCAC	awards	points	to	competitive	project	applications	for	those	projects	located	within	a	
half	mile	of	transit	service,	a	locational	incentive	found	to	be	effective	in	other	states	(19,	54).		
This	should	hold	particularly	true	for	senior	housing,	which	is	also	subject	to	specific	criteria	
about	access	and	proximity	to	medical	facilities	in	California’s	tax	credit	allocation	plan	(19).	
Inclusionary	housing	can	be	expected	to	at	least	match	market	rate	development	with	respect	
to	locational	outcomes	by	policy	design.		Cities	implement	mandates	on	new	developments	in	
which	anywhere	from	10%	to	30%	of	new	units	in	any	development	must	be	affordable,	and	
these	units	are	referred	to	as	inclusionary	units	(62).		However,	some	cities	do	allow	developers	
to	pay	in-lieu	fees	(109).		Under	policy	regimes	in	which	inclusionary	housing	policies	are	
mandatory	for	all	jurisdictions,	inclusionary	units	are	found	to	be	evenly	spaced	across	regions	
(65).		Given	that	inclusionary	housing	is	widespread	in	use	in	our	case	study	regions	(110),			we	
should	expect	inclusionary	housing	to	perform	well	compared	to	market	rate	development.	
California’s	redevelopment	program	is	almost	completely	unstudied	with	respect	to	the	
locational	outcomes	of	sites.			The	modern	scheme	of	redevelopment	in	California	commenced	
with	Proposition	18,	which	enabled	local	redevelopment	agencies	to	receive	funding	through	
tax-increment	financing	(111).		Subsequent	policy	changes	in	the	state,	especially	Proposition	
13,	created	conditions	wherein	cities	increasingly	expanded	their	definitions	of	redevelopment	
“project	areas”	to	increase	funding	availability	(111).		Because	these	programs	were	primarily	
concentrated	in	urban	areas,	however,	we	may	hypothesize	that	they	should	outperform	
market	rate	production	with	respect	to	job	and	transit	access,	particularly	in	fast	growing	
regions	where	many	suburban	communities	may	still	be	too	new	to	require	their	own	
redevelopment	programs.		In	contrast,	the	areas	targeted	for	redevelopment	may	be	
communities	which	have	previously	faced	systematic	underinvestment	(hence	they	are	
targeted	for	redevelopment),	and	thus	these	projects	may	underperform.		It	is	worth	reiterating	
that	locational	benefits	are	just	one	of	the	many	kinds	of	benefits	of	affordable	housing	like	
improved	health	and	educational	outcomes	(108).		In	cases	where	the	housing	is	part	of	
community	revitalization,	the	lack	of	positive	locational	outcomes	should	not	be	counted	
against	these	programs—they	may	be	a	component	in	a	bigger	effort	to	improve	an	existing	
location,	instead	of	relocating	people	elsewhere.	
Gathering	The	Data	
The	data	on	affordable	housing	production	was	gathered	following	a	five	step	process	outlined	
by	Palm	and	Niemeier	(112).		This	process	is	summarized	in	Figure	1.		As	jurisdictions	report	
affordable	housing	to	their	respective	metropolitan	planning	organizations	(MPOs),	the	process	
involved	searching	through	state	and	local	planning	records	identifying	sites	and	units	until	the	
dataset	matched	what	the	jurisdictions	reportedly	produced.		This	process	was	necessary	
because	California	did	not	maintain	a	comprehensive	dataset	on	affordable	housing	production	
from	all	programs	statewide	during	this	study	period,	2000	to	2010	(113).		Data	on	market	rate	
production	was	pulled	from	the	United	States	Census	Bureau.		It	is	worth	noting	that	many	
projects	included	some	component	of	multiple	programs:	some	inclusionary	funding	and	tax	
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credits,	or	redevelopment	and	tax	credit	support.		These	were	allowed	to	count	in	the	
distributions	of	each	source	they	were	funded	by.	
	
Figure	1:	Housing	Production	Documentation	Process	
	 	
Outcome	variables	for	units	are	summarized	in	Table	1.	As	described	in	the	previous	chapter,	
our	analysis	includes	multiple	measures	of	jobs-housing	balance	that	have	been	found	to	be	
significant	predictors	of	‘excess	commuting’	and	commute	times	(2,	16,	26).		As	also	discussed	
previously,	we	include	the	more	low-wage	worker	sensitive	measure	of	jobs-housing	fit	(1).		
Based	on	their	importance	in	TCAC	regulations,	we	include	access	to	medical	facilities	and	
grocery	stores	(19,	54).		We	also	include	poverty	level,	as	poverty	concentration	in	projects’	
sites	has	long	been	a	challenge	supply	side	programs	have	been	trying	to	address	(33,	34).		As	
scholars	have	evaluated	the	effectiveness	of	the	location	of	affordable	housing	with	respect	to	
need,	we	include	the	measure	used	by	those	researchers	to	define	need:	the	percent	of	
households	rent	burdened	(35).		Lastly,	we	include	exploratory	results	on	air	quality	and	school	
quality.		All	measures	at	the	Census	Tract	Scale.		
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Table	1:	Summary	Statistics	of	Outcome	Measures	for	Units	
		 Minimum	 Median	 Mean	 Maximum	
Jobs	Housing	Balance	(2.5	Mile	Buffer)	 0.002	 0.760	 1.136	 9.964	
Jobs	Housing	Balance	(5	Mile	Buffer)	 0.088	 0.877	 1.061	 14.540	
Jobs	Within	45	Minute	Auto	Commute	 0.000	 134369.364	 186646.840	 916589.448	
Low	Wage	Jobs	to	Affordable	Housing	Fit	 0.000	 3.570	 5.310	 31.230	
Jobs	Within	45	Minute	Transit	Commute	 0.000	 657.261	 5235.145	 115939.862	
Number	of	Medical	facilities	Per	1000	
people	(5	Mile	Buffer)	 0.000	 1.280	 1.490	 7.680	
PM	2.5	Concentration	 4.140	 9.780	 9.819	 12.500	
Percent	of	Tract	Residents	Within	.5	Mile	
of	Grocery	Store	 0.000	 35.090	 44.253	 100.000	
Percent	of	Households	Below	200%	of	
Poverty	Level	 0.000	 22.420	 26.556	 96.660	
Change	in	Nearest	Elementary	School	
Academic	Performance	Index	Score	
(2000-2014)	
-0.045	 0.143	 0.185	 0.880	
Academic	Performance	Index	Score,	
Nearest	Elementary	School	(2002-14	
427.000	 847.000	 843.847	 998.000	
Percent	of	Households	Rent	Burdened	
(2010-14	American	Community	Survey)	 15.380	 48.910	 49.481	 85.190	
		 		 		 		 		
	
Results	
Results	across	all	three	regions	with	respect	to	job	access	are	presented	in	Figure	2.		All	figures	
in	this	section	plot	the	distribution	of	units	with	respect	to	the	locational	outcome	labeled	
above	each	set	of	distributions.		Red	lines	denote	the	75th	percentile	for	each	distribution.		The	
higher	the	red	bar	is,	the	greater	the	number	of	units	funded	by	that	program	at	the	upper	end	
of	the	outcome	variable’s	distribution.		The	mean	for	each	distribution	is	in	black	and	median	in	
blue.		The	distributions	represent	the	distribution	of	units	funded	by	each	program	(or	not,	as	in	
the	case	of	market	rate	units).		This	is	distinct	from	the	distribution	of	projects,	which	can	
contain	between	one	and	four	hundred	plus	units.		
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Figure	2:	Differences	in	Job	Access	Outcomes	By	Funding	Source	
On	jobs	housing	balance,	redevelopment	funded	units	outperform	market	rate	units	in	terms	of	
mean	and	median,	unlike	tax	credit	and	inclusionary	units.		However,	the	top	quarter	of	market	
rate	units	(with	respect	to	jobs-housing	balance)	is	in	neighborhood	with	systematically	better	
jobs	housing	balance	than	the	top	quarter	of	redevelopment	units	as	defined	by	the	same	
outcome	variable.		With	respect	to	job	access	by	auto	commute,	market	rate	units	perform	
about	the	same	against	all	three	programs,	except	that	redevelopment	and	tax	credit	funded	
units	have	a	top-heavy	distribution	with	respect	to	this	measure	(see	red	bars).		On	low	wage	
jobs	to	affordable	housing	balance,	or	jobs-housing	fit,	market	rate	units	outperform	the	three	
programs	dramatically	(bottom	right	chart).		Among	the	three	affordable	housing	program	
types,	redevelopment	performs	best	on	this	metric,	followed	by	tax	credits	with	inclusionary	
housing	performing	the	worst.		Figure	3	presents	strikingly	different	results	on	job	access	by	
transit,	and	access	to	other	facilities.			
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Figure	3:	Differences	in	Transit	Access	and	Quality	Of	Life	Outcomes	By	Funding	Source	
Recalling	that	California’s	Tax	Credit	Allocation	Committee	prioritizes	projects	proximate	to	
transit,	medical	facilities	and	grocery	stores,	Figure	3	shows	the	program	is	having	mixed	
effects.	Tax	credit	funded	units	dramatically	outperform	market	rate,	inclusionary	and	
redevelopment	units	with	respect	to	jobs	accessible	by	transit.		In	contrast,	there	is	no	major	
difference	between	the	three	programs	and	market	rate	units	with	respect	to	access	to	medical	
services.		For	access	to	groceries,	redevelopment	and	inclusionary	units	perform	best,	followed	
by	tax	credit	funded	projects.		Units	created	through	all	three	programs	perform	better	than	
market	rate	units	on	this	outcome.			
In	terms	of	exposure	to	poor	air	quality	(bottom	left	chart),	tax	credit	units	have	the	greatest	
exposure,	followed	by	market	rate	units.		Similarly	concerning	results	for	tax	credit	funded	units	
are	presented	in	Figure	4.	
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Figure	4:	Differences	in	Education,	Rent	and	Poverty	Outcomes	By	Funding	Source	
With	respect	to	poverty	rates,	market	rate	units	dramatically	outperform	units	funded	by	all	
three	kinds	of	programs.		Tax	credit	funded	units	are	disproportionately	located	in	
neighborhoods	with	higher	poverty	rates	relative	to	inclusionary	and	redevelopment	units	(top	
left	chart).		The	educational	results	are	more	mixed.		While	the	average	Academic	Performance	
Index	(API)	score	of	the	nearest	elementary	school	was	highest	for	market	rate	units	(top	right	
chart),	the	average	change	in	the	API	from	2000-2014	was	lowest	for	market	rate	units	(bottom	
left	chart).		This	means	that	while	market	rate	units	were	more	likely	to	be	located	in	areas	with	
higher	elementary	school	API	scores,	the	affordable	units	funded	by	all	three	programs	are	
locating	in	areas	where	the	schools	have	at	least	been	improving	over	the	last	fifteen	years.		
Lastly,	the	affordable	units	are	systematically	located	in	areas	with	higher	rent	burdens	than	
market	rate	units	(bottom	right).		This	is	a	good	thing,	as	it	means	affordable	units	are	locating	
in	areas	where	the	need	for	affordable	housing	is	higher	(which	may	explain	the	higher	poverty	
rate	results,	too).	
Multi-Region	Results:	Senior	Versus	Non-Senior	Housing	
Because	senior	housing	sites	are	sometimes	subject	to	different	locational	criteria,	we	present	
the	spatial	outcomes	of	senior	projects	relative	to	both	market	rate	and	other	affordable	new	
construction	in	this	section.	
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Figure	5:	Differences	in	Senior-Specific	Outcome	Measures	
Requirements	and	incentives	for	senior	affordable	housing	to	locate	near	medical	facilities	
appear	to	have	no	effect	(top	left	chart	of	Figure	5).		In	contrast,	incentives	that	places	these	
projects	near	transit	appear	to	have	a	significant	impact	(top	right	chart).		Senior	affordable	
housing	out	performs	market	rate	production	with	respect	to	grocery	access	(bottom	left	
chart),	but	under	performs	compared	to	other	affordable	projects.		As	with	other	affordable	
housing	projects,	senior	housing	has	slightly	higher	PM	2.5	concentrations	than	market	rate	
production,	on	average.		
Results	By	Region:	San	Francisco	Bay	Area	
Job	accessibility	results	for	the	Bay	Area	are	presented	in	Figure	6.			
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Figure	6:	Differences	in	Job	Access	Outcomes	By	Funding	Source,	Bay	Area	
In	the	Bay	Area,	affordable	housing	units	across	all	three	funding	sources	perform	similarly	
against	market	rate	units	with	respect	to	jobs	housing	balance.		With	respect	to	job	access	by	
automobile,	distribution	means	do	not	vary	by	program	type,	although	the	upper	end	of	the	
distributions	for	market	rate	and	tax	credit	units	are	similarly	higher	than	those	of	inclusionary	
and	redevelopment	supported	units.		With	respect	to	jobs	housing	fit,	market	rate,	
redevelopment	and	tax	credit	funded	units	all	perform	similarly,	and	are	trailed	slightly	by	
inclusionary	units.		These	results	contrast	with	job	access	by	transit,	presented	in	Figure	7.	
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Figure	7:	Differences	in	Transit	Access	and	Quality	Of	Life	Outcomes	By	Funding	Source,	Bay	
Area	
Market	rate	units	out	perform	all	three	programs	with	respect	to	jobs	within	a	45	minute	transit	
commute.		In	contrast,	there	is	little	difference	across	all	four	distributions	with	respect	to	
medical	access	and	PM	2.5	concentrations.		Only	in	terms	of	grocery	access	(bottom	right),	do	
affordable	units	outperform	market	rate	production,	and	this	is	limited	to	inclusionary	and	
redevelopment	funded	units.	Socio-economic	factors	are	presented	in	Figure	8.	
		
23	
	
Figure	8:	Differences	in	Education,	Rent	and	Poverty	Outcomes	By	Funding	Source,	Bay	Area	
As	with	the	overall	patterns,	in	the	Bay	Area	market	rate	units	are	in	lower	poverty	
communities	compared	to	affordable	units	(top	left	chart).		Similarly,	market	rate	units	are	in	
areas	where	the	elementary	schools	have	higher	API	scores	(top	right	chart).		Unlike	the	overall	
patterns,	in	the	Bay	Area	only	redevelopment	and	tax	credit	funded	units	outperform	market	
rate	units	with	respect	to	being	near	schools	that	have	been	improving	over	the	past	15	years	
(bottom	left	chart).			
Results	By	Region:	San	Diego	
Job	access	results	for	San	Diego	are	presented	in	Figure	9.			
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Figure	9:	Differences	in	Job	Access	Outcomes	By	Funding	Source,	Bay	Area,	San	Diego	
In	San	Diego,	market	rate	units	dramatically	outperform	affordable	units	with	respect	to	jobs	
housing	balance	and	jobs-housing	fit.		Inclusionary	and	tax	credit	units	in	particularly	perform	
much	worse	on	jobs-housing	fit	than	market	rate	units	(bottom	right).		Yet	when	it	comes	to	
jobs	accessible	by	automobile	commute,	differences	are	much	smaller:	there	is	a	large	tail	
among	redevelopment	supported	units	at	the	upper	and	lower	ends	of	the	distribution,	and	
inclusionary	units	perform	slightly	worse	that	market	rate	units.		The	job	access	by	transit	
results	in	Figure	10,	however,	paint	a	much	different	picture.	
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Figure	10:	Differences	in	Transit	Access	and	Quality	Of	Life	Outcomes	By	Funding	Source,	San	
Diego	
Tax	credit	units	significantly	outperform	market	rate	units	with	respect	to	jobs	accessible	by	
transit	in	San	Diego	(top	left	chart).		With	respect	to	medical	facility	access	and	PM	2.5	
concentration,	there	are	no	major	discernable	differences.		Affordable	units	across	all	three	
programs	outperform	market	rate	units	with	respect	to	grocery	access.		Despite	policy	efforts	
incentivizing	tax	credit	projects	near	grocery	stories,	units	funded	by	this	program	are	not	in	
systematically	better	locations	with	respect	to	grocery	access	than	redevelopment	and	
inclusionary	units.	Educational	and	poverty	outcomes	are	presented	for	San	Diego	in	Figure	11.	
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Figure	11:	Differences	in	Education,	Rent	and	Poverty	Outcomes	By	Funding	Source,	San	
Diego	
As	with	the	Bay	Area,	market	rate	units	in	San	Diego	are	in	neighborhoods	with	systematically	
lower	poverty	rates	compared	to	affordable	units.		Among	affordable	units,	the	distribution	of	
poverty	rates	is	generally	similar	except	that	tax	credit	units	are	in	areas	with	systematically	
higher	poverty	rates	compared	to	the	other	two	groups	of	affordable	units.		School	quality	
patterns	match	those	in	the	Bay	Area:	affordable	units	are	located	in	areas	where	elementary	
school	API	scores	are	lower	than	for	market	rate	units,	but	these	are	schools	which	have	shown	
more	dramatic	improvements	over	the	last	15	years.		Affordable	units	are	also	more	likely	to	
end	up	in	more	severely	rent	burdened	neighborhoods	in	San	Diego,	but	the	gap	with	respect	
to	market	rate	units	is	smaller	for	this	region	than	for	the	Bay	Area.		
Results	By	Region:	Sacramento	
Sacramento	job	accessibility	results	are	presented	in	Figure	12.	
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Figure	12:	Differences	in	Job	Access	Outcomes	By	Funding	Source,	Sacramento	
Sacramento	breaks	with	the	previously	reported	patterns	of	market	rate	units	outperforming	
affordable	units	with	respect	to	job	access.		On	jobs	housing	balance	by	a	2.5	or	5	mile	
threshold,	affordable	units	in	all	three	programs	outperform	market	rate	units,	with	
inclusionary	units	more	significantly	outperforming	market	rate	units.		For	jobs-housing	fit,	
inclusionary	units	perform	best,	followed	by	market	rate	units,	then	redevelopment	units,	then	
tax	credit	units.		Lastly,	with	respect	to	job	access	by	car,	all	three	affordable	programs	
outperform	market	rate	units,	with	redevelopment	funded	units	outperforming	market	rate	
most	dramatically.		These	results	also	hold	up	for	job	access	by	transit,	which	is	presented	in	
Figure	13.	
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Figure	13:	Differences	in	Transit	Access	and	Quality	Of	Life	Outcomes	By	Funding	Source,	
Sacramento	
For	job	access	by	transit,	tax	credit	funded	units	perform	best,	followed	by	redevelopment	units	
and	then	inclusionary	units,	which	are	only	marginally	different	on	this	measure	from	market	
rate	production.		On	medical	access,	inclusionary	units	dramatically	outperform	the	other	three	
groups	of	units	and	are	also	clustered	in	communities	with	significantly	lower	PM	2.5	
concentrations.		On	PM	2.5	levels,	redevelopment	and	tax	credit	units	perform	worse	than	
market	rate	production,	as	was	also	shown	to	be	the	case	in	the	Bay	Area.		Educational	and	
poverty	outcomes	for	the	Sacramento	area	are	presented	in	Figure	14.	
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Figure	14:	Differences	in	Education,	Rent	and	Poverty	Outcomes	By	Funding	Source,	
Sacramento	
As	with	prior	regions,	Market	Rate	units	perform	better	with	respect	to	poverty	rates	and	
elementary	school	API	scores	versus	affordable	production.		There	is	one	exception:	
inclusionary	units	in	the	Sacramento	area	outperform	market	rate	and	other	affordable	units	
with	respect	to	elementary	school	API	scores.		Unlike	with	the	previous	regions,	however,	
market	rate	units	also	outperform	affordable	units	with	respect	to	being	located	near	schools	
which	have	been	improving	over	the	last	decade.		Lastly,	only	redevelopment	and	tax	credit	
supported	units	ended	up	in	areas	with	higher	rent	burdens	relative	to	market	rate	production.			
Conclusions	
The	efforts	of	California’s	Tax	Credit	Allocation	Committee	(TCAC)	to	improve	transit	access	and	
grocery	access	for	tax	credit	funded	sites	are	working.		Among	senior	projects	in	particular	
these	results	are	the	most	pronounced.		However,	these	results	appear	to	come	at	the	cost	of	
these	projects	locating	in	areas	with	higher	poverty	rates	(relative	to	market	rate	production).	
That	said,	we	find	that	based	on	McClure’s	approach	to	defining	need	as	neighborhood	rent	
burdens	(35),	all	three	types	of	programs	are	placing	units	in	tracts	with	greater	need	compared	
to	market	rate	units.		This	begs	the	question:	if	the	greatest	need	is	in	high	opportunity	areas,	
should	we	be	focusing	our	efforts	on	building	housing	elsewhere?	The	systematic	concentration	
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of	affordable	units	in	tracts	with	higher	PM	2.5	concentration	relative	to	new	market	rate	
production,	however,	is	another	concern	born	out	of	these	findings.		
Lastly,	inclusionary	units	do	not	appear	to	mimic	the	spatial	distribution	of	market	rate	
production.		This	may	be	due	to	the	‘in-lieu	fee’	option	of	many	inclusionary	programs	that	
enable	developers	to	pay	fees	in-lieu	of	developing	housing	on	site.	Future	research	should	
dissect	if	in-lieu	fee	supported	units	are	in	systematically	better	or	worse	locations,	as	
measured	by	these	and	other	metrics,	compared	to	on-site	inclusionary.	The	results	could	hold	
serious	implications	for	how	cities	should	structure	the	trade-off	they	present	developers	when	
allowing	an	in-lieu	fee	alternative.		
TCAC	might	consider	exploring	alternative	approaches	to	concentrating	development	near	
opportunity,	like	Illinois’	approach	of	blending	all	the	metrics	into	a	general	index	of	“high	
opportunity”	and	“low	opportunity”	areas	instead	of	offering	separate	sets	of	points	for	specific	
amenities.		How	these	different	approaches	impact	locational	outcomes	and	associated	costs	
should	be	explored	further	in	the	literature.	
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Chapter	3:	The	Impact	of	Scale	Changes	of	Fair	Market	Rents	on	
Transit	and	Jobs	Access	of	Section	8	Eligible	Units	in	Three	of	
California’s	Largest	MPOs	
The	Department	of	Housing	and	Urban	Development	(HUD)	is	currently	experimenting	with	
new	ways	of	defining	subsidy	caps	for	Section	8	housing	vouchers.		This	change,	called	the	
“Small	Area	Fair	Market	Rent”	(SAFMR),	shrinks	the	geographic	scale	at	which	voucher	
maximums	are	calculated	from	the	region	level,	known	as	the	HUD	Market	Area,	to	the	ZIP	
code	level;	this	change	has	major	implications	for	the	spatial	dispersion	of	voucher	holders	in	
cities.		The	results	of	a	pilot	program	in	Texas	suggests	that	this	policy	scale	change	is	exhibiting	
significant	impact	on	voucher	holders’	residential	location	decisions	(47).		The	potential	for	the	
policy	change	to	impact	voucher	holder	access	into	California’s	transit	and	jobs	rich	
neighborhoods	could	also	be	significant	but	has	not	been	studied.		In	this	study,	we	model	how	
rescaling	voucher	maximums	from	the	regional	level	to	the	ZIP	code	level	alters	the	voucher	
accessibility	of	affordable	rental	units.	We	model	this	change	using	a	database	of	for-rent	
listings	spanning	three	of	California’s	metropolitan	planning	organizations	(MPOs):	the	San	
Francisco	Bay	Area	(MTC-ABAG),	Sacramento	(SACOG)	and	San	Diego	(SANDAG).		We	spatially	
contrast	our	rental	listings	with	data	on	neighborhood	transit	richness	and	jobs	access	in	order	
to	examine	how	the	FMR	policy	shift	may	compliment	or	complicate	regional	efforts	to	increase	
housing	affordability	in	these	“low	VMT”	communities.		We	calculate	voucher	maximums	at	
three	alternative	scales,	the	county,	the	public	use	micro	sample	area	(PUMA)	and	the	ZIP	code.	
We	contrast	how	these	smaller-scaled	FMRs	alter	voucher	holders’	access	to	neighborhoods	
compared	to	the	current	FMRs	scaled	over	multi-county	“Market	Areas”	that	generally	
encompass	large	numbers	(e.g.,	millions	in	some	locations)	of	residents.		
Our	results	show	that	under	existing	HUD	(FMR)	policy,	voucher	recipients	are	systematically	
priced	out	of	rental	listings	in	jobs	and	transit	rich	communities	and	moreover,	that	voucher	
accessible	units	are	concentrated	in	high	poverty	neighborhoods.		We	find	that	shrinking	the	
geographic	scale	at	which	voucher	maximums	are	calculated	significantly	improves	the	voucher	
accessibility	of	rental	units	in	jobs	rich	communities,	but	any	improvements	in	voucher	access	
to	transit	rich	rental	units	is	limited	to	the	City	of	San	Francisco.		We	find	that	this	increased	
access	also	brings	with	it	the	added	benefit	of	significantly	increasing	voucher	access	to	rental	
units	in	low	poverty	neighborhoods,	a	critical	HUD	metric.		Within	the	scholarly	literature,	our	
approach	is	unique	in	that	we	are	modeling,	by	neighborhood,	the	percentage	of	actual	rental	
listings	that	voucher	holders	could	consider	given	HUD	voucher	maximums	(the	FMRs).		
The	next	section	provides	background	on	housing	voucher	programs	and	the	demand	for	
affordability	in	California.	We	provide	a	review	of	relevant	literature	as	well.		We	then	describe	
our	dataset	and	our	approach	to	modeling	alternative	FMRs,	with	a	presentation	of	our	results	
following.			Since	the	distribution	of	actual	voucher	accessible	market	rental	listings	under	
existing	policies	has	never	been	explored,	we	begin	our	discussion	of	the	results	by	examining	
voucher	access	to	jobs	rich,	transit	rich	and	low	poverty	communities	under	existing	policies.		
We	then	show	how	re-scaling	FMRs	alters	this	landscape.		The	large	body	of	results	are	
summarized	in	the	conclusion	section	with	recommendations	for	housing	policy	makers	
federally,	statewide	across	these	three	specific	MPOs.		
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Housing	Vouchers	In	the	California	Context	
Section	8	vouchers	are	a	federal,	demand-side	rental	subsidy	program	introduced	in	the	1970s	
as	part	of	a	shift	in	federal	housing	policy	away	from	substandard	housing	clearance	and	
towards	the	goal	of	reducing	household	rent	burdens	(114).		Housing	vouchers	enable	residents	
to	move	to	any	unit	on	the	market	with	rents	below	the	HUD	determined	Fair	Market	Rent	
(FMR)	maximum.		These	FMRs	are	based	on	the	40th	percentile	rent	for	a	two	bedroom	unit	in	
the	voucher	recipients’	HUD	Market	Areas.1		Tenants	pay	one-third	of	their	income	towards	
rent,	with	the	rest	paid	directly	to	the	landlord	by	the	voucher	administering	agency.		Local	
Public	Housing	Authorities	(PHAs)	serve	as	administering	agencies	for	vouchers	across	California	
and	the	United	States.		Landlords	agreeing	to	accept	vouchers	are	required	to	meet	a	number	
of	obligations,	including	regular	inspections	of	units,	which	frequently	deter	landlords	from	
accepting	voucher	holders	(115).			
With	the	demolition	of	public	housing,	HUD	expanded	voucher	use	to	provide	displaced	
residents	with	“Housing	Choice	Vouchers.”	Scholars	argued	that	providing	residents	the	
opportunity	to	move	out	of	high	poverty	neighborhoods	could	break	a	cycle	of	poverty	re-
enforced	by	the	spatial	mismatch	between	the	location	of	low	income	households	and	the	
availability	of	low	wage	employment	within	urban	areas	(29).		HUD	enabled	researchers	to	
explicitly	test	this	hypothesis	by	designing	a	policy	experiment	in	which	some	residents	of	
dilapidated	public	housing	projects	received	housing	vouchers	they	could	only	spend	in	low-
poverty	neighborhoods:	the	Moving	to	Opportunity	(MTO)	program,	the	results	of	which	are	
discussed	in	the	next	section.	
Together,	the	nation’s	housing	voucher	programs	currently	serve	over	five	million	people	in	two	
million	households	(116).		Within	California,	the	program	faces	major	demand	pressure,	with	
waitlists	for	vouchers	in	the	San	Francisco	Bay	Area	exceeding	capacity	by	tens	of	thousands	
and	requiring	local	administering	agencies	to	close	waitlists	(117).		Even	in	areas	of	the	state	
considered	more	affordable,	e.g.,	Fresno,	waitlists	are	three	to	four	times	greater	than	the	
program’s	capacity	(118).		The	effect	of	a	policy	shift	like	the	re-scaling	of	voucher	maximum	
payouts	could	significantly	impact	the	ability	of	this	program	to	meet	these	demand	pressures	
by	altering	the	cost	of	vouchers.	This	study	represents	the	first	to	explore	how	altering	the	
policy	structure	of	the	voucher	program	could	affect	voucher	holders	access	to	low-VMT	
neighborhoods.	
Section	8	and	Low	VMT	Neighborhoods	
Most	of	the	voucher	literature	centers	on	the	results	of	the	MTO	experiment	regarding	
participants’	health	and	employment	outcomes,	the	latter	of	which	should	theoretically	
correlate	with	job	access.	Recipients	of	the	MTO	experimental	vouchers	initially	received	only	
minor	benefits	from	participation	(119–121).		However,	follow	up	studies	of	participants	10	to	
15	years	after	treatment	found	significant	improvements	in	subjects’	physical	and	mental	
health	(119).		Children	whose	families	took	vouchers	into	lower-poverty	neighborhoods	
																																																						
1	HUD	Market	Areas	do	not	always	overlap	with	other	regional	delineations.		For	example,	the	San	Francisco	
Metropolitan	Statistical	Area	is	split	into	two	HUD	Market	Areas:	one	which	includes	San	Francisco,	Marin	and	San	
Mateo	counties	versus	another	which	includes	Alameda	and	Contra	Costa	counties.	
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experienced	higher	college	attendance	rates,	higher	earnings,	and	were	less	likely	to	end	up	as	
single	parents	(122).		Overall,	however,	the	literature	suggests	the	benefits	of	MTO	were	much	
weaker	than	the	‘neighborhood	effects’	hypothesis	may	suggest	(123).		But	if	we	look	at	the	
Gautreaux	program,	a	court	ordered	initiative	which	provided	vouchers	to	former	public	
housing	residents	relocated	into	Chicago’s	high	opportunity	suburbs,	dramatic,	rather	than	
marginally,	improved	outcomes	for	recipients	were	observed	(124,	125).		How	do	we	reconcile	
the	striking	differences	between	the	Gautreaux	and	MTO	outcomes?	Some	have	argued	the	
real	failure	of	MTO	may	be	that	it	failed	failed	to	enable	beneficiaries	to	break	out	of	the	spatial	
structure	of	segregated	cities	(126).		This	evaluation	might	imply	the	treatment	was	simply	too	
weak	or	failed	to	tackle	a	major	component	of	the	problem,	racial	segregation	and	
discrimination.	
Because	improving	accessibility	and	mobility	were	not	the	primary	motivators	for	the	MTO	
experiment,	the	major	MTO	studies	generally	operationalize	job	accessibility	as	simply	tract	
level	unemployment	rates,	i.e.,	without	consideration	of	geographical	proximity	to	employment	
centers.	The		role	of	transportation	options	is	usually	mentioned	only	in	passing	(121).		In	fact,	
many	studies	looking	at	the	effects	of	changes	in	employment	outcomes	do	not	measure	job	
accessibility	of	recipients’	new	neighborhoods	at	all,	focusing	only	on	tract	level	poverty	rates	
(e.g.	Kling,	Liebman,	&	Katz,	2007;	Ludwig,	Duncan,	&	Pinkston,	2005)	or	more	simplistically:	
walking	distance	to	some	form	of	public	transit	(e.g.	Sanbonmatsu	et	al.,	2003).			
There	have	been	a	few	studies	of	the	residential	relocation	choices	of	voucher	recipients	with	
respect	to	transit	and	job	accessibility,	with	both	measures	more	rigorously	defined	as	in	the	
transportation	and	planning	literatures.		There	is	moderately	strong	evidence	that	having	an	
automobile	improves	employment	outcomes	(Bania,	Coulton,	&	Leete,	2003;	Blumenberg	&	
Pierce,	2014),	and	that	increased	transit	accessibility	does	not	seem	to	alter	pre/post	move	
employment	status	(129).	That	is,	improvements	in	transit	service	did	not	help	previously	
unemployed	residents	find	employment.				While	these	results	are	striking,	the	Blumenberg,	
Pierce	analysis	did	not	contextualize	their	results	within	Sampson’s	(2008)	critique	of	the	
treatment	itself:	how	significant	were	the	improvements	in	job	and	transit	accessibility	
experienced	by	program	participants	whose	neighborhood	relocation	outcomes	were	upwardly	
mobile?		Could	voucher	holders	even	afford	to	access	neighborhoods	with	significantly	richer	
transit	connectivity	and	job	access?	
In	contrast	to	previous	studies,	our	work	fills	an	important	research	gap	by	examining	the	
extent	to	which	voucher	recipients	can	afford	to	live	in	transit	and	jobs	rich	neighborhoods	
given	FMR	constraints.	Specifically,	we	explore	how	access	to	housing	in	higher	neighborhoods	
changes	under	various	FMR	spatial	contexts	using	actual	rental	market	data	in	three	of	the	
nation’s	most	expensive	rental	markets:	MTC,	SACOG,	and	SANDAG.	There	are	five	HUD	Market	
Areas	within	these	three	MPOs:	San	Jose	(Santa	Clara	County),	the	East	Bay	(Alameda	and	
Contra	Costa	counties),	San	Francisco	(San	Francisco,	Marin	and	San	Mateo	counties),	
Sacramento	(Sacramento,	Placer	and	El	Dorado	counties)	and	San	Diego	(San	Diego	County).	
Our	data	also	allows	us	to	model	how	proposed	changes	to	voucher	rent	thresholds	may	affect	
the	ability	of	voucher	recipients	to	access	low-VMT	communities.		
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Scale	and	the	FMR	
Since	HUDs	FMRs	are	calculated	with	metropolitan	statistical	area	medians	and	percentiles,	
they	are	insensitive	to	the	much	finer	scale	at	which	our	urban	areas	are	segregated	along	lines	
of	income	and	race	(130).		New	policy	innovations	by	HUD,	like	the	Small	Area	Fair	Market	
Rents	(SAFMRs),	might	help	convert	Section	8	vouchers	into	the	kind	of	high	opportunity	
neighborhood	mobility	treatment	that	policy	makers	intended	for	MTO	vouchers.		The	first	
SAFMR	program	was	implemented	in	Dallas,	Texas	in	2012,	and	was	in	response	to	a	court	
order	declaring	the	existing	FMR	formulas	reinforced	residential	segregation	and	thus	were	
illegal	under	federal	civil	rights	laws	(131).		Under	the	SAFMR	policy,	voucher	maximums	are	
calculated	at	the	ZIP	code	scale	in	lieu	of	established	regionally	based	formulas.		Within	three	
years	of	implementation,		Dallas	participants	had	moved	into	neighborhoods	with	significantly	
lower	poverty	and	crime	rates	(47),	while	at	the	same	time,	the	cost	of	financing	the	vouchers	
actually	declined	(132).		The	Dallas	study,	while	intriguing,	is	constrained	in	its	generalizability	
by	two	issues.	First,	the	study	results	were	achieved	in	one	of	the	nation’s	most	affordable	
rental	markets:	Dallas	(133).		And	second,	consistent	with	the	previous	literature	on	vouchers,	
the	Dallas	studies,	to	date,	have	not	examined	voucher	recipients’	neighborhood	outcomes	
with	respect	to	job	access	and	transportation.			
Methods	and	Data		
We	offer	two	major	advances	to	the	literature	on	vouchers:	first,	we	examine	the	capability	of	
voucher	holders	to	access	job	accessible	and	“low	VMT”	communities.	Second,	we	explore	how	
changing	the	FMR	subsidy	boundaries	affects	the	ability	of	voucher	holders	to	access	for-rent	
listings	in	lower	poverty	neighborhoods.	To	accomplish	these	two	objectives,	we	take	
advantage	of	advanced	data	acquisition	tools	now	available	and	utilize	a	dataset	of	for-rent	unit	
listings	in	our	three	study	areas.	This	unique	database	allows	us	to	determine	the	extent	to	
which	voucher	maximums	themselves,	as	opposed	to,	for	example,	landlord	discrimination	
against	voucher	holders,	prevent	voucher	recipients	from	accessing	jobs-rich	communities.	
Defining	Low	VMT	Neighborhoods	
The	transportation	and	planning	literatures	has	explored	a	wide	array	of	outcome	measures	
with	respect	to	job	accessibility	and	transit	accessibility.		We	have	taken	from	this	literature	and	
prioritized	outcome	measures	that	could	be	gathered	consistently	across	all	three	MPOs	(Table	
1).		We	adopted	a	transit	accessibility	measure	from	the	Environmental	Protection	Agency’s	
Smart	Location	Database.		Transit	accessibility	is	correlated	with	voucher	holders’	ability	to	
maintain	employment	after	moving	(129)	as	well	as	correlated	with	reduced	VMT	(4,	80,	134).		
We	selected	two	measures	for	jobs	accessibility:	jobs-housing	balance	and	jobs-housing	fit,	or	
the	ratio	between	low	wage	jobs	and	housing	units	affordable	to	low	wage	workers.		Jobs-
housing	imbalances	across	regions	are	associated	with	higher	VMT	and	excess	commuting	(3,	
16,	26).		Spatial	disparities	in	jobs-housing	fit	is	associated	with	commute	distances	among	low	
income	workers,	and	has	been	shown	to	be	a	helpful	measure	of	the	job	accessibility	of	low	
income	households	(1,	17,	135).		However,	as	we	are	interested	in	seeing	this	policy	enable	
voucher	holders	to	live	in	those	jobs-rich	areas,	we	must	counter-intuitively	define	“low	VMT”	
communities	as	those	with	high	jobs-housing	fit,	high	jobs-housing	balance,	and	a	high	number	
		
35	
of	jobs	accessible	by	transit	within	a	45	minute	commute.		A	household	added	to	a	community	
a	high	imbalance	(more	jobs	than	housing)	is	contributing	to	correcting	the	imbalance.	
	
Table	2:	Measures	of	Neighborhood	VMT	Potential	
Variable	 Description	 Source	
Transit	Access	to	Employment		 Number	of	jobs	a	resident	can	
reach	within	45	minutes	by	
transit,	time-decay	weighted	
Environmental	Protection	
Agency’s	Smart	Location	
Database	(SLD)	
Jobs-Housing	Balance	 The	ratio	of	jobs	to	households	
within	a	distance	of	a	tract	or	
block,	usually	2.5	or	5	miles	
Census	Longitudinal	Employer-
Household	Dynamics	(LEHD)	
Jobs-Housing	Fit	 The	ratio	of	low	wage	jobs	to	
housing	units	affordable	to	low	
wage	households		
UC	Davis	Center	for	Regional	
Change	Regional	Opportunity	
Index	(ROI)	
		
As	HUD’s	long-standing	concern	in	voucher	policy	has	been	to	increase	recipients’	access	to	low	
poverty	neighborhoods	(119),	we	also	examine	changes	in	the	poverty	rate.		As	the	official	
poverty	rate	has	come	under	criticism	for	not	factoring	in	regional	cost	of	living	in	expensive	
states	like	California	(136),	we	opt	to	use	a	similar	but	more	encompassing	variable:	the	percent	
of	residents	in	a	tract	living	at	or	below	200%	of	the	poverty	level.	
Rental	Listings	Data	
We	use	a	rental	database	prepared	by	Rent	Jungle,	which	gathers	for-rent	listings	from	internet	
sources	such	as	Craigslist,	as	well	as	the	web-listings	provided	by	newspapers	and	community	
web	pages	on	a	weekly	basis.		The	data	scan	is	completed	each	week	using	a	uniform	collection	
of	listings	cross-referenced	over	hundreds	of	sources	in	each	metropolitan	area.		In	total,	our	
for-rent	database	has	over	150,000	listings	across	the	five	HUD	Market	Areas	for	2012	and	
2013.			
The	data	contain	multiple	listings	when	units	have	been	advertised	as	available	over	multiple	
weeks	or	in	some	cases,	when	there	are	multiple	units	available	at	a	single	site.	Our	interest	in	
the	rental	market	is	relatively	straightforward:	we	want	the	inventory	of	available	rentals	in	any	
given	year.	To	create	the	inventory,	we	assigned	a	unique	observation	id	for	every	unit	with	a	
unique	combination	of	the	following:	an	address,	number	of	bedrooms	and	year	of	listing	(2012	
versus	2013).		If	the	same	unit	was	listed	twice	in	the	database	with	a	minimum	six	month	span	
in	between,	it	was	noted	as	being	available	twice	during	that	year.		In	those	cases	where	a	unit	
was	listed	in	both	2012	and	2013	with	its	availability	remaining	and	moving	from	2012	into	
2013,	it	was	allowed	to	count	in	both	years	if	the	total	span	of	its	availability	was	greater	than	
six	months	(e.g.	if	it	was	available	from	September	2012	through	April	2013.		These	heuristics	
reduced	the	total	sample	from	150,000	to	95,868	units.	With	400	ZIP	codes	in	our	five	market	
areas,	this	provides	us	with	an	average	of	240	observations	per	ZIP	code,	far	higher	than	the	
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number	of	new	renters	that	provided	by	the	American	Community	Survey2,	and	an	average	of	
44	observations	per	census	tract.		The	only	limitation	of	this	approach	is	that	we	cannot	gauge	
the	vacancy	rates	for	listings	on	large	multifamily	sites,	and	future	research	should	examine	
how	to	incorporate	vacancy	rates	into	use	of	this	kind	of	highly	detailed,	disaggregate	data.	
Producing	Alternative	FMRs	
We	recalculate	fair	market	rents	at	scales	smaller	or	equal	to	the	HUD	Market	Area:	the	county,	
the	Public	Use	Micro	Sample	Area	(PUMA)	level	and	the	Zip	Code	Tabulation	Area	(henceforth	
referred	to	as	ZIP	code).				We	included	the	PUMA	scale	because	it	is	the	smallest	geography	at	
which	Census	micro	data	is	available	for	producing	hypothetical	alternative	FMRs.		
When	calculating	alternative	or	hypothetical	FMRs,	we	attempted	to	align	the	process	at	each	
scale	with	the	process	constraints	HUD	faces	when	defining	FMRs	at	the	Market	Area	scale.		
This	ensures	that	when	we	compare	how	differently	scaled	FMRs	alter	voucher	access	to	our	
rental	listings	dataset,	we	are	measuring	the	role	of	scale	in	pre-determining	voucher	access	
and	not	some	other	aspect	of	the	FMR	formula	process.		For	example,	HUD	must	work	with	ACS	
data	produced	on	a	time	lag—the	2012	FMRs	were	estimated	using	the	2005-2009	ACS,	and	the	
2013	FMRs	were	estimated	using	the	2006-2010	ACS.		HUD	offers	insight	on	the	Small	Area	
FMR	Demonstration	Documentation	webpage	for	how	sub-FMR	thresholds	might	be	
determined	using	calculations	for	hypothetical	ZIP	code	FMRs	(137).		First,	HUD	calculates	
Market	Area	FMRs	under	established	formulas.		Then,	HUD	produces	a	rental	ratio	or	‘weight’	
for	each	ZIP	code	which	is	multiplied	by	the	Market	Area	FMR	to	get	each	ZIP	code’s	FMR.		The	
ratio	is	derived	by	dividing	ZIP	code	median	rents	from	the	ACS	over	Core-Based	Statistical	Area	
median	rents,	as	illustrated	below:		
	 ZIP2− Bedroom Median RentCBSA 2− Bedroom Median Rent ∗ HUD Market Area FMRs = ZIP FMRs	
	 	
ZIP	codes	with	median	rents	higher	than	their	CBSA	thus	have	FMRs	adjusted	proportionally	
upwards.		HUD	caps	these	adjustment	factors	at	1.5,	so	that	a	ZIP	code’s	FMRs	are	never	more	
than	150%	of	the	established	Market	Area	FMRs.		HUD	does	not,	however,	set	a	threshold	for	
zip	codes	below	the	median.		This	approach	side-steps	the	problem	that	at	very	fine	geographic	
scales,	the	number	of	“recent	movers”	in	the	ACS	may	be	too	small	to	provide	a	reliable	
estimate	of	new	rents,	as	the	median	rent	statistic	draws	on	the	entire	sample	of	renters.			The	
CBSAs	are	not	necessarily	the	same	as	the	HUD	Market	Areas.		For	example,	The	San	Jose,	San	
Francisco	and	East	Bay	HUD	Market	Areas	are	all	part	of	one	CBSA.		It	is	worth	noting	that	HUD	
staff	believe	that	ZIP	code	estimates	would	better	represent	small-scale	differences	if	they	were	
normalized	over	the	broadest	possible	area,	in	this	case,	the	CBSA	(Correspondence	with	HUD	
Staff	Dec.	3	2015).			
																																																						
2	While	the	ACS	does	not	publish	sample	sizes	for	small	scales,	using	state-level	sample	sizes	(154)	we	can	deduce	
that	the	2014-2010	ACS	contains	roughly	390	responses	per	ZIP	code	in	California	to	represent	the	total	housing	
stock.		As	roughly	half	of	Californian	households	rent,	the	ACS	thus	probably	averages	195	rental	units	surveyed	
per	ZIP	Code.	As	roughly	12%	of	renters’	move	annually	(155),	then	we	can	estimate	the	ACS	contains	around	24	
new-movers	per	ZIP	code	in	California,	compared	to	our	sample	of	nearly	240	listings	per	ZIP	code.		
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Utilizing	this	strategy,	we	apply	this	ratio	or	weight-based	approach	used	by	HUD	to	transform	
established	Market	Area	FMRs	into	FMRs	scaled	at	the	County,	PUMA,	including	the	Housing	
Income	variable,	and	ZIP	code	based	FMRs.		For	each	set	of	alternate	FMRs,	the	source	tables	
utilized	to	calculate	the	ratios	is	listed	in	Table	3.		All	of	these	were	divided	over	their	respective	
CBSA	median	weights	to	produce	the	weights.	
	
Table	3:	Data	Used	to	Calculate	Alternative	FMRs	
Alternate	Scale	 Source	Data	for	Scale	
County	 County	Median	Rents	
PUMA	 Public	Use	Microdata	Sample	(PUMS)	file,	median	calculated	from	HINCP	variable	
ZIP	Code	 Zip	Code	Tabulation	Area	Median	Rent	
	
In	line	with	HUD’s	proposed	SAFMRs,	we	capped	the	ratios	used	to	generate	alternate	FMRs	so	
that	they	could	be	no	higher	than	1.5	times	the	Market	Area	FMR.		In	the	case	of	the	PUMA	
FMRs,	we	limited	the	microdata	sample	used	to	produce	the	median	rent	statistic	to	reflect	the	
types	of	households	HUD	includes	in	Market	Area	FMR	calculation:	renter-occupied,	non-
institutional	quarters	with	a	kitchen	and	full	plumbing.	
Results	
San	Francisco	and	Oakland	HUD	Market	Areas	
As	mapped	in	Figure	15	below,	shifting	to	ZIP	code	FMRs	dramatically	reduces	voucher	access	in	
pockets	of	formerly	high	voucher-access,	but	increases	voucher	access	less	dramatically	across	
larger	geographic	spans.		This	amounts	to	a	‘leveling	out’	of	voucher	accessibility	across	space.		
In	the	San	Francisco	HUD	Market	Area,	this	means	voucher	accessibility	declines	in	previously	
high	voucher	access	areas	like	the	south	eastern	quadrant	of	San	Francisco	and	the	North	Bay	
suburb	of	San	Rafael.		Previously	voucher-inaccessible	peninsula	suburbs	like	San	Mateo,	
Redwood	City	and	Pacifica	become	more	voucher	accessible,	as	does	most	of	San	Francisco	
proper.		This	‘leveling	out’	pattern	is	also	visible	in	suburbs	with	access	to	the	Bay	Area	Rapid	
Transit	(BART),	including	Millbrae	and	San	Bruno.	The	western	half	of	San	Francisco	proper	also	
sees	gains	in	voucher	accessibility	of	between	3%	and	50%	of	all	rental	units	depending	on	the	
neighborhood.		
In	the	Oakland	HUD	Market	Area	voucher	accessibility	is	redistributed	more	dramatically	as	a	
result	of	an	FMR	shift.	Areas	which	previously	held	high	concentrations	voucher	eligible	units	in	
Richmond,	West	Oakland	and	central	Oakland	see	precipitous	drops	in	voucher	accessibility.		
Meanwhile,	voucher	accessibility	increases	among	rental	units	in	the	southern	suburbs	of	Union	
City	and	Fremont	as	well	as	the	eastern	suburbs	of	Dublin,	Pleasanton,	Brentwood	and	
Livermore.		
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Figure	15	Percentage	Point	Changes	in	Voucher	Accessibility	When	Shifting	from	a	Market	
Area	FMR	to	a	ZIP	Code	FMR	in	San	Francisco	and	the	East	Bay	
	 	
In	the	San	Francisco	HUD	Market	Area,	the	overall	percentage	of	rental	listings	in	the	rental	
database	that	voucher	holders	would	be	able	to	access	rises	from	15.7%	to	28.2%	when	shifting	
from	a	ZIP	code	FMR.		In	the	East	Bay,	the	total	percentage	of	rental	listings	accessible	to	
voucher	holders	actually	declines	in	a	shift	to	ZIP	code	FMRs,	from	34%	accessible	to	32.9%.		
This	small	loss	appears	to	come	with	the	benefit	of	increasing	voucher	accessibility	in	the	
Market	Area’s	suburbs.		However,	the	shift	triggers	a	dramatic	loss	in	voucher	access	in	Oakland	
proper,	with	the	percent	of	rental	listings	within	city	limits	accessible	to	voucher	holders	
declining	from	38.6%	to	24.7%,	a	loss	of	nearly	50%.	
The	significant	increase	in	voucher	accessible	units	in	the	San	Francisco	HUD	Market	Area	does	
not	significantly	increase	the	job	accessibility	of	the	voucher-accessible	stock	relative	to	the	
voucher	inaccessible	rental	listings,	as	illustrated	in	Figure	16.		The	violin	plots	in	Figure	16	show	
the	distributions	of	the	voucher	accessible	listings	and	voucher	inaccessible	housing	listings	and	
how	those	distributions	change	as	the	FMRs	are	defined	at	different	scales.		The	black	bars	
represent	the	averages	for	the	respective	distributions.		As	the	scale	at	which	FMRs	are	defined	
declines,	the	voucher	accessible	stock	shifts	slightly	towards	neighborhoods	with	greater	jobs-
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housing	fit,	as	seen	in	the	top	left	chart	of	Figure	16.		This	means	voucher	accessibility	shifts	
towards	neighborhoods	where	there	are	many	more	low	wage	jobs	than	there	is	housing	
affordable	to	low	wage	workers.	
	
	
Figure	16	Shifts	In	Distribution	of	Outcome	Variables	By	Voucher	Accessibility	and	FMR	Scale	
in	the	San	Francisco	HUD	Market	Area	
	
With	respect	to	overall	jobs	housing	balance	within	2.5	miles	of	a	neighborhood,	and	the	
number	of	jobs	within	a	45	minute	transit	commute,	the	shift	to	smaller	FMRs	does	not	
significantly	improve	outcomes	with	respect	to	voucher	accessible	units.	Lastly,	shrinking	the	
scale	at	which	FMRs	are	defined	shifts	the	voucher-accessible	pool	of	units	to	lower	poverty	
communities	as	evidenced	in	the	bottom	right	chart	of	Figure	16.			
	The	Oakland	HUD	Market	Area	also	shows	similar	patterns	with	no	movement	in	the	average	
jobs-housing	balance	of	rental	listings	accessible	to	voucher	holders.		However,	as	the	scale	at	
which	FMRs	are	defined	shrinks,	the	disparity	in	jobs-housing	fit	between	voucher	accessible	
and	inaccessible	units	nearly	vanishes.			
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Figure	17	Shifts	In	Distribution	of	Outcome	Variables	By	Voucher	Accessibility	and	FMR	Scale	
in	the	Oakland	HUD	Market	Area	
	
Under	the	current	FMRs,	voucher	accessible	units	in	the	Oakland	HUD	Market	Area	are	
concentrated	in	areas	with	significantly	higher	poverty	rates	as	illustrated	in	the	bottom	right	
chart	of	Figure	17.		This	disparity	declines	significantly	when	FMRs	are	defined	at	the	ZIP	code	
scale.	
Santa	Clara-San	Jose	HUD	Market	Area	
In	The	Santa	Clara-San	Jose	HUD	Market	Area,	the	shift	to	ZIP	code	FMRs	reduces	voucher	
access	in	the	eastern	neighborhoods	of	the	City	of	San	Jose,	but	modestly	increases	voucher	
access	in	the	suburbs	of	Saratoga,	Los	Gatos,	Cupertino	and	Milpitas.		This	change	is	mapped	in	
Figure	18	below.		Losses	in	voucher	eligibility	are	dramatic	in	eastern	San	Jose,	as	well	as	the	
southern	suburb	of	Gilroy	(see	inset).		
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Figure	18	Percentage	Point	Changes	in	Voucher	Accessibility	When	Shifting	from	a	Market	
Area	FMR	to	a	ZIP	Code	FMR	in	the	Santa	Clara-San	Jose	HUD	Market	Area	
	
Despite	the	large	loss	of	voucher	accessibility	in	east	San	Jose	and	the	more	modest	voucher	
access	gains	in	the	suburbs,	the	overall	share	of	rental	listings	in	this	market	accessible	to	
voucher	holders	declines	by	two	percentage	points,	from	27.7%	to	25.7%.			
	 	
This	slight	loss	in	overall	voucher	accessibility	comes	with	two	major	benefits	illustrated	in	
Figure	19.		First,	the	disparity	in	jobs-housing	fit	between	voucher	accessible	and	inaccessible	
stock	virtually	vanishes	as	FMR	scale	declines	(top	left	chart).		Second,	the	over-representation	
of	voucher	accessible	units	in	high	poverty	communities	also	nearly	vanishes	(bottom	left	
chart).	
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Figure	19	Shifts	In	Distribution	of	Outcome	Variables	By	Voucher	Accessibility	and	FMR	Scale	
in	the	Santa	Clara-San	Jose	HUD	Market	Area	
	 	
As	with	the	San	Francisco	and	Oakland	HUD	Market	Areas,	however,	this	region’s	voucher	
accessible	stock	does	not	significantly	shift	into	transit	rich	and	high	jobs-housing	balance	
neighborhoods	as	FMR	scale	declines.	
San	Diego	HUD	Market	Area	
The	San	Diego	HUD	Market	Area	provides	the	most	compelling	evidence	of	the	benefits	of	
shifting	to	a	ZIP	code	FMR,	as	mapped	in	Figure	20.		Voucher	accessibility	declines	dramatically	
in	high	poverty	neighborhoods	south	of	Interstate	8	and	east	of	the	San	Diego	Bay.		The	loss	is	
matched	by	equally	dramatic	increases	in	voucher	accessibility	in	San	Diego	neighborhoods	
north	of	Interstate	8.		In	the	northern	suburbs,	voucher	accessibility	shifts	towards	the	coast:	
declining	in	the	inland	suburbs	of	Vista	and	Escondido	while	increasing	in	the	coastal	suburbs	of	
Oceanside,	Encinitas	and	Carlsbad.				
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Figure	20	Percentage	Point	Changes	in	Voucher	Accessibility	When	Shifting	from	a	Market	
Area	FMR	to	a	ZIP	Code	FMR	in	San	Diego	
	
On	the	southern	end	of	San	Diego	County,	voucher	access	declines	National	City	and	San	Diego	
neighborhood	Otay	Mesa	but	increases	in	equal	measure	in	eastern	half	Chula	Vista.		Overall,	
57.9%	of	rental	listings	in	this	Market	Area	are	accessible	to	voucher	holders	under	ZIP	code	
FMRs,	compared	to	just	49%	under	current	FMRs—an	8.8	percentage	point	increase.		
San	Diego	also	sees	the	most	dramatic	improvements	in	our	outcome	measures	for	voucher	
accessible	units,	as	illustrated	in	Figure	20.			
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Figure	21	Shifts	In	Distribution	of	Outcome	Variables	By	Voucher	Accessibility	and	FMR	Scale	
in	the	San	Diego	HUD	Market	Area	
		 	
The	disparity	in	jobs-housing	fit	between	voucher	accessible	and	inaccessible	units	reverses	in	
San	Diego	under	a	shift	to	ZIP	code	FMRs,	while	the	disparity	in	overall	jobs-housing	balance	is	
nearly	eliminated.	The	concentration	of	voucher	accessible	units	in	high	poverty	neighborhoods	
also	vanishes	as	more	rental	listings	in	low-poverty	neighborhoods	become	voucher	accessible	
(bottom	left	right).		
Sacramento	HUD	Market	Area	
In	Sacramento,	the	shift	to	ZIP	code	FMRs	decreases	voucher	access	in	the	core	of	Sacramento	
proper	while	increasing	voucher	access	in	northern	and	eastern	suburbs,	as	illustrated	in	Figure	
22.		The	suburbs	which	see	the	largest	increases	in	voucher	accessibility	are	Granite	Bay,	
Folsom,	El	Dorado	Hills,	Rocklin,	Lincoln,	Loomis	and	Roseville.	
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Figure	22	Percentage	Point	Changes	in	Voucher	Accessibility	When	Shifting	from	a	Market	
Area	FMR	to	a	ZIP	Code	FMR	in	Sacramento	
	
Suburbs	closers	to	the	City	of	Sacramento,	like	Rio	Linda	and	Antelope,	see	modest	increases	in	
voucher	access,	as	does	the	southern	suburb	of	Elk	Grove.		The	overall	voucher	accessibility	of	
rental	listings	in	the	Sacramento	HUD	Market	Area	rise	from	66.5%	to	72.9%	as	a	direct	result	of	
the	shift	to	ZIP	code	FMRs.		Voucher	eligibility	is	highest	in	Sacramento	among	our	five	case	
study	HUD	market	areas	because	Sacramento’s	FMRs	were	calculated	using	census	median	
rents,	as	opposed	to	40th	percentile	rents,	during	the	years	covered	by	this	analysis.		HUD	has	
since	returned	Sacramento	to	FMRs	based	on	40th	percentile	census	rents.	
Figure	23	presents	changes	in	the	distribution	of	our	outcome	variables	for	voucher	accessible	
and	inaccessible	units	under	different	FMR	scales.	Sacramento	follows	a	similar	pattern	to	Bay	
Area	HUD	Market	Areas,	with	voucher	accessible	units	shifting	to	lower	poverty	communities	
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(bottom	left	chart)	and	communities	with	improved	jobs-housing	fit	(top	right	chart).		Unlike	
with	previously	reviewed	regions,	voucher	accessible	units	actually	shift	to	areas	with	lower	
jobs-housing	balances	as	FMR	scale	declines	(top	right	chart).		This	may	be	explained	by	the	
significant	loss	of	voucher	accessible	units	in	and	around	downtown	Sacramento—home	of	the	
state	Capitol	and	large	concentration	of	State	government	jobs.		As	with	previous	Market	Areas,	
rescaling	FMRs	does	not	appear	to	‘move	the	needle’	on	jobs	accessible	by	transit	for	voucher	
accessible	units.				
	
	
Figure	23	Shifts	In	Distribution	of	Outcome	Variables	By	Voucher	Accessibility	and	FMR	Scale	
in	the	Sacramento	HUD	Market	Area	
Conclusions		
Across	all	five	case	study	“HUD	Market	Areas,”	shifting	HUD	FMR	policy	to	finer	geographic	
scales	increases	voucher	holders’	access	to	listed	rental	units	in	low	poverty	and	jobs	rich	
neighborhoods.		Only	in	the	San	Francisco	market	area	does	this	policy	shift	increase	voucher	
holder	access	to	units	in	transit-rich	neighborhoods,	and	then	only	slightly.		In	the	Sacramento,	
San	Francisco	and	San	Diego	markets,	FMR	re-scaling	de-concentrates	or	“levels	out”	rental	unit	
availability	for	voucher	holders	more	evenly	across	space.		Local	governments	and	public	
housing	authorities	in	these	regions	should	consider	working	with	HUD	to	transition	their	
voucher	programs	to	Small	Area	Fair	Market	Rents.		
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In	contrast,	re-scaling	FMRs	appears	to	merely	shift	the	un-even	concentration	of	voucher	
accessible	units	in	the	East	Bay	away	from	Oakland	and	Richmond	and	towards	suburbs	further	
south	and	east,	with	voucher	eligibility	in	Oakland	proper	declining	by	50%.		The	particularly	
dramatic	loss	of	voucher	accessible	units	in	rapidly	gentrifying	east	Oakland	under	this	policy	
framework	in	particular	should	be	of	concern.		Further	research	should	flesh	out	if	the	
unreliability	of	rental	estimates	at	smaller	geographic	scales	explains	why	these	rapidly	
gentrifying	neighborhoods	are	so	sensitive	to	policy	scale	shifts.		Policy	makers	and	housing	
agencies	in	the	San	Jose	market	should	also	be	worried	about	how	a	shift	to	small	scale	FMRs	
appears	to	dramatically	reduce	voucher	accessibility	in	large	segments	of	eastern	San	Jose	and	
the	City	of	Gilroy.	
The	concerning	results	for	the	East	Bay	and	San	Jose	highlight	the	potential	need	for	HUD	to	
establish	FMR	floors	when	shifting	to	small	scaled	FMRs	in	a	fashion	similar	to	HUD’s	current	
ceiling.		For	example,	HUD	might	consider	ensuring	that	ZIP	code	FMRs	cannot	be	less	than	70%	
of	the	Market	Area	FMRs	that	would	otherwise	be	instituted.	Future	research	can	determine	
where	this	threshold	may	need	to	be.	
Lastly,	it	is	important	to	highlight	that	the	tremendous	gains	in	access	to	rental	units	in	jobs	rich	
and	low-wage	jobs	rich	neighborhoods	brought	about	by	smaller	scaled	FMRs	does	not	come	at	
the	expensive	of	HUD’s	efforts	to	get	voucher	holders	out	of	high	poverty	neighborhoods.		In	
contrast,	small	scale	FMRs	significantly	increase	the	number	of	for-rent	listings	in	low-poverty	
neighborhoods	that	would	be	accessible	to	voucher	holders.		
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Chapter	4:	Is	Prioritizing	Affordable	Housing	in	California’s	Rail	
Accessible	and	Jobs-Rich	Neighborhoods	Increasing	Development	
Costs?	
California	tax	payers	have	supported	bonds	in	excess	of	a	billion	dollars	to	fund	housing	
construction	in	infill	parcels	and	rail	accessible	neighborhoods	under	the	state’s	Infill	
Infrastructure	Grant	(IIG)	and	Transit	Oriented	Development	(TOD)	housing	subsidy	programs	
(89).		Little	analysis	has	explicitly	examined	how	prioritizing	affordable	housing	development	in	
transit	and	jobs	rich	neighborhoods	in	this	way	impacts	the	cost	of	developing	affordable	
housing	generally,	or	with	respect	to	light	rail	access	specifically.			This	is	unfortunate,	as	
potential	costs	increases	translate	into	a	reduction	in	the	total	number	of	affordable	units	that	
can	be	produced	given	the	limited	housing	resources	states	possess.		In	fact,	the	high	cost	of	
constructing	affordable	housing	in	California	recently	led	the	state’s	Legislative	Analyst’s	Office	
to	conclude	that	solving	the	state’s	housing	crisis	by	subsidizing	new	affordable	housing	
construction	would	be	prohibitively	expensive	(138).		In	this	research,	we	ask	how	much	of	the	
cost	of	affordable	housing	in	California	is	due	to	the	emphasis	that	the	state	housing	policy	
places	on	rail	access.		The	existing	literature	(e.g.,	see	the	recent	synthesis	of	Zuk	et	al	2015)	
suggests	that	affordable	housing	costs	should	be	affected	by	proximity	to	rail.		
Nationally,	one	of	the	most	important	resources	for	creating	affordable	housing	is	the	
Department	of	Housing	and	Urban	Development’s	(HUDs)	Low	Income	Housing	Tax	Credit	
(LIHTC).	This	program	provides	the	budget	authority	for	state	and	local	LIHTC-allocating	
agencies	to	issue	tax	credits	for	the	acquisition,	rehabilitation,	or	new	construction	of	rental	
housing	targeted	to	lower-income	households	(139).	In	California,	a	budget	authority	in	excess	
of	$90,000,000	for	LIHTC	is	administered	through	the	California	Tax	Credit	Allocation	
Committee	(TCAC).		We	use	data	gathered	from	the	LITHC	applications	prepared	by	affordable	
housing	developers	to	create	a	dataset	of	affordable	housing	project	budgets	for	the	years	2008	
to	2016.		Using	ordinary	least	squares	and	spatially	lagged	regression,	we	develop	cost	models	
for	affordable	housing	projects	to	predict	the	effects	of	rail	transit	and	job	access	on	projects’	
total	development	costs	(per	unit).		We	use	spatially	weighted	regression	to	then	examine	how	
the	effects	of	key	determinants	vary	across	space.	The	study	data	are	projects	located	in	the	
state’s	four	largest	metropolitan	areas:	the	San	Francisco	Bay	Area,	Sacramento,	Los	Angeles	
and	San	Diego.		
In	both	our	ordinary	and	spatially	lagged	multivariate	regressions,	our	modeling	suggests	that	
proximity	to	rail	stations	has	only	a	very	weak	(non-significant)	effect	(on	a	cost	per	unit	basis)	
for	affordable	housing	development.		With	respect	to	job	access,	we	found	that	job	access	
within	a	45	minutes	transit	or	automobile	commute	has	only	a	weak	effect	on	cost;	however,	
we	do	find	significant	positive	effects	for	the	jobs-housing	balance	in	and	around	housing	
projects’	neighborhoods.		That	is,	the	greater	the	jobs	relative	to	housing	around	a	given	
project,	the	higher	the	total	development	cost	per	unit.				
Theoretical	Rational:	Why	Affordable	Housing	Near	Rail	Should	Be	More	Expensive	
The	literature	offers	an	almost	unanimous	perspective	on	the	impacts	of	transit	infrastructure	
and	jobs	access	on	rents	and	home	values:	as	consumers	recognize	the	commute	cost	savings	
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of	living	near	jobs	and	transit,	they	bid	up	land	and	property	values	in	transit	and	jobs	rich	
neighborhoods	(140–142).	In	fact,	the	literature	is	clear	that	close	proximity	to	fixed	route	
transit	can	increase	land	or	property	values	from	between	1%	to	15%	(91–93,	96).		The	
evidence	of	this	effect	is	stronger	in	TODs,	developments	intentionally	designed	to	maximize	
resident	and	employee	use	of	adjacent	transit	(94,	95,	97,	143).		Panel	studies	suggest	transit-
proximity	has	played	a	larger	role	influencing	land	and	property	markets	since	the	Great	
Recession	(91,	98).	Therefore,	we	would	expect	that	affordable	housing	in	close	proximity	to	
major	rail	infrastructure	should	also	be	significantly	more	expensive	than	affordable	housing	
built	elsewhere.		Affordable	housing	developers	have	voiced	this	as	a	critical	concern,	since	
they	cannot	include	land	values	in	the	calculation	of	their	tax	credit	subsidies	(19).	
There	are	also	a	small	number	of	studies	that	have	inconclusive	or	negative	results,	suggesting	
that	transit	may	not	always	have	a	meaningful	impact	on	property	values.	One	study	of	
fourteen	cities	found	that	transit	raised	property	values	in	only	three:	Chicago,	Boston	and	
Washington	D.C.	(Kahn,	2007).		Gatzlaff	&	Smith	(1993)	failed	to	find	a	significant	effect	of	rail	
construction	on	property	values	in	single	family	homes	along	a	new	rail	line	in	Miami.	These	
results,	which	stand	in	contradiction	to	the	bulk	of	the	literature,	raise	the	possibility	that	–	at	
least	in	some	cities	–	there	are	factors	through	which	transit	may	affect	property	values:	it	is	
not	enough	that	a	transit	station	is	built,	that	station	must	also	measurably	improve	residents’	
access	to	jobs	and	amenities	to	induce	residents	to	bid	up	rents.		Studies	on	the	San	Francisco	
Bay	Area	have	found	the	price	per	square	foot	of	housing	is	significantly	influenced	by	the	
number	of	jobs	within	a	45	commute	shed	(59,	146).		This	suggests	that	any	analysis	of	transit	
proximity	should	include	measures	of	job	accessibility	that	may	affect	affordable	housing	
development	costs.	
Other	Rail	Access	Related	Factors	Contributing	to	Cost	Escalation		
Affordable	housing	adjacent	to	major	rail	transit	may	appear	more	expensive	not	just	because	
of	increased	land	values,	but	also	because	these	projects	tend	to	be	infill	projects	that	face	
additional	expenses	such	as	roads	and	sewage	upgrades	(77,	89).		Additionally,	projects	in	these	
neighborhoods	may	be	more	expensive	because	structures	may	be	significantly	taller,	requiring	
more	expensive	inputs	and	the	inclusion	of	expensive	attributes	like	elevators	(21).		
Theoretically,	many	non-rail	accessible	infill	projects	also	face	these	added	costs,	but	much	of	
the	costs	can	be	recouped	through	market	value	sales.	Practically	speaking,	when	the	available	
land	near	transit	is	zoned	high	density	or	requires	significant	infrastructure	upgrades—these	
are	the	costs	the	state	bears	when	it	promotes	affordable	development	near	rail.		
What	Determines	the	Cost	of	Affordable	Housing?	
Labor,	land	and	material	are	the	basic	drivers	of	housing	production	costs,	including	affordable	
housing	costs	(147).		These	factors	are	both	space	and	time	variant,	requiring	empirical	
modeling	of	affordable	cost	trends	to	account	for	labor	market	trends	over	time	and	the	spatial	
segmentation	of	labor	and	land	markets.	Most	of	the	other	variables	reviewed	in	the	literature	
affect	affordable	housing	costs	through	a	project’s	land	values	or	the	demand	for	labor	or	
material	inputs.		We	can	thus	expect	housing	and	labor	markets	themselves	to	be	significant	
predictors	of	affordable	housing	costs.	We	also	expect	that	any	regulatory	mandates	that	
require	increased	wages	for	construction	workers	or	higher	quality	materials	to	increase	the	
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cost	of	affordable	housing	projects,	as	prevailing	wage	laws	have	been	found	to	increase	
affordable	housing	development	costs	between	8%	and	12%	in	multiple	site-specific	analysis	
(148).		Economies	of	scale	do	exist	in	affordable	housing	production,	with	per	unit	development	
costs	declining	as	the	number	of	units	in	a	project	increases	(21).		More	units	on	smaller	parcels	
of	land,	or	higher	densities,	can	help	offset	land	costs	(ibid).		Zoning	standards	and	regulations	
can	also	affect	costs.	Minimum	parking	requirements	have	been	targeted	as	prime	culprits	of	
higher	development	costs	in	housing,	including	affordable	housing	projects	(22,	102,	103).				
Many	attributes	of	an	affordable	housing	infill	project	are	pre-determined	not	by	local	zoning	
regulations	or	labor	market	conditions,	but	by	the	populations	served	by	the	projects.		In	
California,	state	law	and	tax	credit	regulations	offer	a	varied	set	of	standards	like	parking	
requirements	and	unit	sizes,	which	depend	on	the	population	a	project	serves	(19).		Legislation	
recently	passed	in	California	prevents	a	project	serving	seniors,	for	example,	from	requiring	
anything	more	than	.5	parking	space	per	senior	unit	and	.3	spaces	per	special	needs	unit	(149).		
Single-Resident	Occupancy	(SRO)	projects	require	much	fewer	square	footage	than	projects	
aimed	at	large	families.		Thus,	the	type	of	project	and	population	served	can	be	a	significant	
predictor	of	project	costs.			
Finally,	the	income	of	levels	of	residents	expected	to	dwell	in	affordable	housing	projects	also	
indirectly	affects	project	costs	because	rents	are	determined	by	incomes.		Practitioners	refer	to	
this	as	the	“depth	of	affordability.”		Rents	on	a	tax	credit	funded	site	are	generally	no	more	
than	one	third	of	a	household’s	income,	so	the	lower	the	average	income	of	residents	on	site,	
the	lower	the	rents	and	the	greater	the	“depth	of	affordability,”	and	thus,	the	amount	of	
subsidy	needed.		In	the	last	decade,	some	evidence	suggests	that	developers	may	be	locating	in	
sites	that	minimize	the	amount	of	subsidy	families	are	receiving	by	locating	in	areas	where	
rents	are	already	lower	or	the	projects	can	win	special	spatially	defined	“bonus”	subsidies	from	
tax	credit	allocating	agencies	(37).	
Empirical	Setting	
We	compiled	the	applications	for	Low	Income	Housing	Tax	Credits	(LIHTC)	that	were	submitted	
to	the	California	Tax	Credit	Allocation	Committee	(TCAC)	from	2008	through	2016.		We	used	R	
to	extract	and	compile	our	dataset.		The	competition	for	funding	is	stiff	and	because	many	
projects	can	end	up	applying	for	tax	credits	multiple	times,	we	identified	and	removed	
duplicate	projects,	keeping	only	the	very	latest	application	for	each	project.		Limiting	the	
dataset	to	the	latest	applications	of	new	construction	projects	resulted	in	a	total	sample	size	of	
949.		We	also	eliminated	observations	located	in	regions	with	little	to	no	rail	infrastructure.		The	
analysis	was	constrained	to	the	state’s	four	largest	metropolitan	planning	organizations,	all	of	
which	contain	major	transit	systems:	San	Francisco	Bay	Area,	Greater	Sacramento	Area,	Greater	
Los	Angeles	Area	and	Inland	Empire,	and	San	Diego	County.	Finally,	projects	often	did	not	
contain	complete	information,	and	these	were	also	eliminated.		The	final	complete	dataset	
used	for	this	analysis	contained	496	observations	(Table	1).	
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Table	4:	Data	Preparation	and	Remaining	Sample	Size	
Data	Cleaning	Step		 Remaining	
Sample	Size	
Initial	Tax	Credit	Project	Applications,	2008	to	2016	 2012	
Remove	non-New	Construction	projects	 1340	
Remove	repeat	applications,	keep	latest	and	final	application		 864	
Remove	projects	outside	major	MPOs	with	rail																																				651	
After	removing	projects	with	missing	or	incomplete	records	 496	
	
The	information	contained	in	the	TCAC	applications	included	12	variables	of	interest	to	us;	
these	variables	were	found	to	be	significant	in	previous	studies	of	affordable	housing	costs	(21,	
22).		Our	analysis	dataset	includes	a	wide	distribution	of	development	cost	per	unit,	including	
several	projects	with	costs	below	$200,000	per	unit	(Table	5).		The	distribution	of	total	units	per	
project	tracks	the	distribution	of	the	number	of	parking	spaces,	as	would	be	expected	given	
their	pairwise	correlation	of	.71.		As	evidenced	in	Table	2	the	vast	majority	of	projects	were	
developed	for	large	families	(60%),	followed	by	seniors	(22%).		A	fifth	(N=104)	of	the	projects	
are	within	half	mile	of	rail	stop,	and	12.5%	are	within	a	quarter	mile.		County	indicator	variables	
are	included	as	proxies	for	differences	in	the	land	and	labor	markets	across	the	state.			
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Table	5:	Summary	Statistics	
		 Minimum	 Median	 Mean	 Maximum	
Total	Cost	Per	Unit	 $119,992		 $350,253		 $362,998		 $785,184		
Physical	Attributes	
	 	 	 	Total	Units	 6	 62	 73	 438	
Residential	Square	Feet	Per	Unit	(100s)	 3.36	 8.67	 8.53	 18.49	
Common	Area	Square	Feet	(1000s)	 0	 5.15	 10.07	 101.9	
Commercial	Square	Feet	(1000s)	 0	 0	 1.104	 71.9	
Project	Has	Elevator	 0	 0	 0.409	 1	
Year	Funded	 2008	 2010	 2012	 2016	
Number	of	Parking	Spaces	 5	 73	 95.34	 557	
Has	Underground	Parking	 0	 0	 0.3	 1	
Demographic	Attributes	
	 	 	 	Average	Affordability	 25%	 48.72%	 48.77%	 100%	
Non-Targeted	(baseline	for	following:)	 0	 0	 0.058	 1	
At-Risk	 0	 0	 0.002	 1	
Large	Family	 0	 1	 0.6	 1	
Seniors	 0	 0	 0.22	 1	
Special	Needs	 0	 0	 0.11	 1	
SRO	 0	 0	 0.01	 1	
Transit	And	Job	Access	
	 	 	 	Within	A	1/3	Mile	of	FRT	Stop	 0	 0	 0.157	 1	
Within	Half	Mile	of	FRT	Stop	 0	 0	 0.21	 1	
Within	1/4	Mile	of	FRT	Stop	 0	 0	 0.125	 1	
Jobs-Housing	Fit	 0.17	 2.7	 5.01	 172.15	
Jobs	Within	45	Minutes	By	Transit	 0	 1067	 8195	 71764	
Jobs	Within	45	Minutes	By	Car	 155.1	 190238.7	 253738.9	 839819.3	
Jobs	Housing	Balance	(2.5	Miles)	 0.103	 0.922	 1.26	 6.77	
Jobs	Housing	Balance	(5	Miles)	 0.226	 1.048	 1.129	 2.609	
TOD	Program	 0	 0	 0.06	 1	
County	Indicator	Variables	
	
	
	 		
When	we	compare	the	differences	in	the	distribution	of	total	development	costs	per	unit	
(TDCPU)	by	distance	to	rail	stops,	Figure	24,	we	find	no	obvious	trend	between	proximity	to	
stops	and	total	development	costs.		The	average	TDCPU	does	not	begin	to	decline	significantly	
until	projects	are	greater	than	one	mile	from	rail	stops.		It	is	worth	noting	that	all	but	one	of	the	
projects	with	total	development	costs	above	$700,000	per	unit	were	located	within	a	mile	of	
these	rail	stops.	
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Figure	24:	Distributions	of	Total	Cost	Per	Unit	by	Distance	to	Rail,	LRT	or	Trolley	Stops	
	 	
For	our	modeling,	we	established	indicator	variables	for	projects	that	are	within	a	quarter	mile,	
one-third	mile	or	one-half	mile	of	a	rail	transit	stop.	Our	distances	are	based	on	studies	
identifying	these	thresholds	as	relevant	in	determining	the	effect	of	TODs	on	travel	behavior	
(82).		We	limited	our	calculations	to	passenger	rail,	light	rail	and	trolley	stops,	with	buses	
excluded.	This	is	consistent	with	the	California’s	Transit	Oriented	Development	(TOD)	Program,	
which	in	practice	has	only	funded	projects	in	close	proximity	to	these	types	of	transit	systems	
(89).		This	program	uses	Proposition	1	bond	money	and	is	executed	through	the	Department	of	
Housing	and	Community	Development	(HCD).	We	include	a	separate	indicator	variable	
designating	if	the	project	received	funds	from	the	TOD	program.			
To	capture	job	accessibility,	we	constructed	a	variable	identifying	jobs	within	a	45	minute	
transit	or	automobile	commute	(146).		We	also	included	two	metrics	of	jobs-housing	balance:	1)	
total	jobs-housing	balance	within	2.5	miles	of	a	housing	site’s	census	tract	and	2)	total	jobs-
housing	balance	within	5	miles	of	a	site’s	census	tract.		The	placement	of	more	affordable	
housing	in	communities	with	large	imbalances	may	contribute	to	a	reduction	in	excess	
commuting	created	by	such	imbalances	(2,	16).		Lastly,	since	these	are	affordable	housing	
projects,	we	also	test	for	jobs-housing	fit,	which	is	the	ratio	between	low	wage	workers	and	
housing	units	affordable	to	low	wage	workers	within	2.5	miles	of	a	census	tract.		This	measure	
has	been	found	to	strongly	predict	the	commute	times	and	distances	of	the	low	wage	workers	
who	may	be	eligible	for	affordable	housing,	making	its	relationship	to	affordable	housing	costs	
critically	important	for	our	analysis	(1,	17).	
Results	
The	literature	on	modeling	affordable	housing	is	mixed	in	its	approach.		Some	work	suggests	
geographically	weighted	regression	performs	best	in	predicting	rents	and	property	values	(150),	
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while	others	maintain	that	traditional	OLS	with	spatial	indicator	variables	provides	the	most	
robust	results	(151).		Thus,	we	took	two	approaches.	We	modeled	the	housing	costs	as	a	
function	of	spatial	indicators	using	OLS.	We	also	specified	models	utilizing	a	spatial	lag	approach	
which,	as	we	will	discuss,	corrected	for	spatial	autocorrelation	in	the	Bay	Area	and	Greater	
Sacramento	regions.	As	part	of	our	results,	we	also	present	detailed	mapping	of	how	the	effects	
on	costs	of	key	independent	variables	vary	across	space.	
OLS	Results	
Our	OLS	model	specification	results	are	presented	in		Table	6.		For	visual	simplicity,	the	County	
Indicator	variables	for	each	of	the	models	are	presented	separately	in	Table	7.		Consistent	with	
the	literature,	we	find	evidence	of	economies	of	scale:	the	total	number	of	units	correlates	
negatively	and	significantly	with	total	development	costs.		The	relationship	is	inelastic:	a	one	
percent	increase	in	the	total	number	of	units	produces	a	0.17%	to	0.18%	decrease	in	total	
development	costs	per	unit.	
Residential	square	feet	per	unit,	our	proxy	for	unit	size,	correlates	positively	with	total	
development	costs	as	expected,	as	does	commercial	square	footage.		Common	area	square	
footage	is	positively	but	insignificantly	associated	with	total	development	costs.	The	presence	
of	an	elevator	is	very	weakly	but	positively	associated	with	project	costs.		Perhaps	due	to	the	
collinearity	issue	discussed	in	the	previous	section,	we	do	not	find	the	number	of	parking	units	
correlating	significantly	with	total	development	costs.	However,	we	do	find	the	presence	of	
underground	parking	is	significant,	and	may	increase	the	total	development	cost	by	between	
5.7%	and	7%	per	unit.	
The	average	affordability	level	of	a	project’s	affordable	units	correlates	negatively	with	total	
development	cost;	we	expect	this	based	on	the	literature.		Put	another	way:	a	one	percent	
increase	in	the	HUD-defined	income	levels	of	residents	(requiring	shallower	subsidies)	
decreases	total	development	cost	by	0.7%.		Relative	to	the	baseline	of	projects	that	serve	at-
risk	populations,	only	projects	targeted	at	seniors	are	significantly	different,	having	TDCPUs	
between	9%	and	9.5%	lower.			Projects	facing	the	prevailing	wage	requirement	are	between	
15%	and	16%	more	expensive	than	those	that	are	not	required	to	pay	prevailing	wages.		
Model	1	(M1)	presents	the	results	for	transit	proximity	within	a	third	of	a	mile,	while	Model	2	
(M2)	and	Model	3	(M3)	cover	transit	proximity	within	a	half	mile	and	quarter	of	mile	
respectively.		Model	4	(M4)	presents	results	for	low	wage	jobs	to	affordable	housing	fit.		Model	
5	(M-5)	presents	results	for	jobs	within	a	45	minute	transit	commute	and	Model	6	(M6)	
presents	results	for	jobs	within	a	45	minute	auto	commute.		Models	7	and	8	present	jobs	
housing	balance	results	within	2.5	mile	and	5	mile	buffer	respectively,	and	Model	9	presents	
results	for	participation	in	the	state’s	TOD	affordable	housing	program.	
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	Table	6:	OLS	Regressions	On	(Dependent	Variable	is	Log	of	Total	Development	Costs	Per	Unit)	
		 Baseline	 M1	 M2	 M3	 M4	 M5	 M6		 M7	 M8	 M9	
Intercept	 -53.331***	 -51.923***	 -52.274***	 -52.809***	 -52.601***	 -53.037***	 -53.519***	 -54.158***	 -52.306***	 -54.054***	
Prevailing	Wage	Required	 0.158***	 0.156***	 0.156***	 0.158***	 0.16***	 0.159***	 0.159***	 0.156***	 0.156***	 0.16***	
Total	Units	 -0.168***	 -0.171***	 -0.174***	 -0.17***	 -0.168***	 -0.167***	 -0.168***	 -0.181***	 -0.176***	 -0.168***	
Residential	Sqft.	 0.016**	 0.016**	 0.016**	 0.017**	 0.016**	 0.016**	 0.016**	 0.017**	 0.017**	 0.016**	
Common	Area	Sqft.	 0.001^	 0.001	 0.001^	 0.001	 0.001	 0.001^	 0.001^	 0.001	 0.001	 0.001^	
Commercial	Sqft.	 0.013***	 0.012***	 0.012***	 0.012***	 0.013***	 0.013***	 0.013***	 0.012***	 0.013***	 0.013***	
Project	Has	Elevator	 0.038^	 0.035^	 0.036^	 0.036^	 0.036^	 0.038^	 0.038^	 0.042*	 0.042*	 0.038^	
Year	Funded	 0.033***	 0.033***	 0.033***	 0.033***	 0.033***	 0.033***	 0.033***	 0.034***	 0.033***	 0.034***	
Number	of	Parking	Spaces	 0.006	 0.008	 0.01	 0.007	 0.008	 0.006	 0.006	 0.017	 0.011	 0.006	
Has	Underground	Parking	 0.058**	 0.054**	 0.054**	 0.056**	 0.057**	 0.058**	 0.059**	 0.046*	 0.047*	 0.059**	
Average	Affordability	 -0.005***	 -0.005***	 -0.005***	 -0.005***	 -0.005***	 -0.005***	 -0.005***	 -0.005***	 -0.005***	 -0.005***	
At-Risk	 -0.095	 -0.095	 -0.121	 -0.095	 -0.103	 -0.1	 -0.097	 -0.053	 -0.102	 -0.095	
Large	Family	 0.059	 0.057	 0.057	 0.057	 0.059	 0.059	 0.059	 0.073^	 0.063	 0.06	
Seniors	 -0.103*	 -0.102*	 -0.101*	 -0.103*	 -0.104*	 -0.104*	 -0.103*	 -0.076^	 -0.094*	 -0.102*	
Special	Needs	 -0.018	 -0.018	 -0.019	 -0.018	 -0.02	 -0.018	 -0.018	 0.002	 -0.013	 -0.019	
SRO	 0.098	 0.093	 0.099	 0.093	 0.096	 0.097	 0.096	 0.119	 0.092	 0.102	
In	1/3	Mile	of	Rail	Stop	
	
0.032	
	        In	Half	Mile	of	Rail	Stop	
	  
0.029	
	       In	1/4	Mile	of	Rail	Stop	
	   
0.025	
	      Jobs-Housing	Fit	
	    
-0.001	
	     Jobs	45	Minutes	By	Transit	
	     
0	
	    Jobs	45	Minutes	By	Car	
	      
0	
	   Jobs	Housing	Bal.	2.5	Mi.	
	       
0.028**	
	  Jobs	Housing	Bal.	5	Mi.	
	        
0.046*	
	In	TOD	Program		
	         
-0.017	
R-Squared	 0.6554	 0.6567	 0.6567	 0.6561	 0.6567	 0.6555	 0.6555	 0.6631	 0.6595	 0.6556	
Adjusted	R	Squared	 0.6276	 0.6282	 0.6282	 0.6275	 0.6281	 0.6269	 0.6269	 0.6351	 0.6312	 0.6269	
Moran's	I	P	(North	MPOs)	 0.000***	 0.000***	 0.000***	 0.000***	 0.000***	 0.000***	 0.000***	 0.000***	 0.001***	 0.001***	
Moran's	I	P	(South	MPOs)	 .968	 .984	 .936	 .990	 .965	 .959	 .948	 .775	 .763	 .763	
Significance	Levels:	***.001,		**.01,		*.05,		^.1	
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Table	7:	County	Indicator	Variables	for	OLS	Models	
County	Indicators	 Baseline	 M	1 M	2 M	3 M	4 M	5 M	6	 M	7 M	8 M	9 
Contra	Costa	 -0.121*	 -0.114*	 -0.113*	 -0.116*	 -0.119*	 -0.121*	 -0.119*	 -0.124*	 -0.117*	 -0.124*	
El	Dorado	 -0.365**	 -0.357**	 -0.356**	 -0.361**	 -0.368**	 -0.365**	 -0.362**	 -0.374**	 -0.356**	 -0.368**	
Imperial	 -0.574***	 -0.567***	 -0.567***	 -0.569***	 -0.579***	 -0.573***	 -0.571***	 -0.576***	 -0.577***	 -0.575***	
Los	Angeles	 -0.149***	 -0.142***	 -0.143***	 -0.145***	 -0.15***	 -0.145***	 -0.142***	 -0.158***	 -0.161***	 -0.15***	
Marin		 -0.021	 -0.012	 -0.013	 -0.016	 -0.021	 -0.02	 -0.02	 -0.027	 -0.025	 -0.025	
Napa	 -0.22*	 -0.214*	 -0.213*	 -0.216*	 -0.222*	 -0.22*	 -0.22*	 -0.229**	 -0.225**	 -0.222*	
Nevada	 -0.88***	 -0.874***	 -0.874***	 -0.876***	 -0.881***	 -0.874***	 -0.876***	 -0.926***	 -0.909***	 -0.881***	
Orange	 -0.167***	 -0.159***	 -0.159***	 -0.162***	 -0.156***	 -0.166***	 -0.165***	 -0.175***	 -0.18***	 -0.17***	
Placer	 -0.296**	 -0.287**	 -0.287**	 -0.291**	 -0.3**	 -0.295**	 -0.293**	 -0.308**	 -0.298**	 -0.298**	
Riverside	 -0.326***	 -0.319***	 -0.319***	 -0.322***	 -0.328***	 -0.324***	 -0.324***	 -0.324***	 -0.32***	 -0.328***	
Sacramento	 -0.401***	 -0.399***	 -0.398***	 -0.4***	 -0.404***	 -0.398***	 -0.395***	 -0.425***	 -0.423***	 -0.404***	
San	Diego	 -0.132**	 -0.129**	 -0.132**	 -0.13**	 -0.133**	 -0.131**	 -0.13**	 -0.132**	 -0.133**	 -0.134**	
San	Francisco	 0.302***	 0.302***	 0.299***	 0.301***	 0.3***	 0.302***	 0.301***	 0.301***	 0.278***	 0.298***	
San	Mateo	 0.024	 0.024	 0.024	 0.022	 0.025	 0.029	 0.027	 0.032	 0.024	 0.02	
Santa	Clara	 -0.046	 -0.043	 -0.048	 -0.043	 -0.046	 -0.045	 -0.045	 -0.061	 -0.057	 -0.048	
Solano	 -0.445***	 -0.437***	 -0.437***	 -0.441***	 -0.445***	 -0.445***	 -0.443***	 -0.438***	 -0.436***	 -0.447***	
Sonoma	 -0.207***	 -0.199***	 -0.199***	 -0.202***	 -0.208***	 -0.203***	 -0.199**	 -0.211***	 -0.208***	 -0.209***	
Sutter	 -0.518***	 -0.511***	 -0.51***	 -0.514***	 -0.521***	 -0.517***	 -0.516***	 -0.522***	 -0.508***	 -0.52***	
Ventura	 -0.133*	 -0.124*	 -0.124*	 -0.127*	 -0.133*	 -0.133*	 -0.131*	 -0.13*	 -0.132*	 -0.135*	
Yolo	 -0.32***	 -0.31***	 -0.309***	 -0.314***	 -0.323***	 -0.32***	 -0.32***	 -0.374***	 -0.347***	 -0.323***	
Yuba	 -0.518***	 -0.511***	 -0.51***	 -0.515***	 -0.521***	 -0.517***	 -0.512***	 -0.511***	 -0.511***	 -0.52***	
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None	of	the	rail	transit	indicator	variables	included	in	the	regressions	of	are	significant	at	or	
beyond	the	.05	level.		Moreover,	none	of	the	coefficients	register	effects	are	greater	than	3%.		
The	jobs-housing	fit,	or	the	jobs-housing	balance	experienced	by	low	wage	workers,	is	
uncorrelated	with	total	development	cost	per	unit.		
Relative	to	Alameda,	San	Francisco	is	the	most	expensive	county	in	our	sample	(Table	3),	
followed	by	Ventura,	San	Mateo	and	Santa	Clara.	The	inclusion	of	our	spatially	sensitive	rail	and	
jobs	access	variables	do	not	appear	to	significantly	alter	County	indicator	variables.		
Model	5	(M5)	presents	results	for	jobs	within	a	45	minute	transit	commute	and	Model	6	
presents	results	for	jobs	within	a	45	minute	auto	commute.	Neither	are	significant.		In	contrast,	
Total	jobs-housing	balance	within	both	a	2.5	mile	radius	and	five	mile	radius,	are	significantly	
and	positively	associated	with	per	unit	development	costs	as	demonstrated	in	Models	M7	and	
M8.		Model	9	presents	results	for	the	effects	of	participation	in	the	state	TOD	program,	which	
have	no	significant	effect	on	costs.	
The	model	specifications	account	for	66%	of	the	variance	in	the	dependent	variable,	which	is	
lower	than	the	80%	attained	by	a	previous	study	of	affordable	housing	development	costs	in	
California	(21).		However,	that	study	had	a	much	smaller	sample	(284	projects	versus	our	496),	
which	may	partially	explain	the	difference.		Additionally,	the	previous	analysis	included	a	
variable	on	construction	material	quality	that	we	were	unable	to	replicate.	
We	ran	separate	Moran’s	I	tests	of	spatial	autocorrelation	in	the	model	residuals	for	the	North	
versus	South	MPOs,	and	found	highly	significant	spatial	autocorrelation	in	the	Bay	Area	and	
Sacramento,	but	none	in	Los	Angeles	and	San	Diego.		To	ensure	the	spatial	autocorrelation	
would	not	bias	our	results,	we	duplicated	our	OLS	regressions	with	a	specified	spatial	lag,	the	
results	of	which	are	presented	in	the	next	subsection.	
Spatially	Lagged	Regressions	
The	first	half	of	the	spatially	lagged	regressions	are	presented	in	Table	8.		As	in	the	previous	
subsection,	County	indicator	variables	are	presented	in	separate	table	for	ease	of	reading,Table	
9.		In	these	models,	total	unit	count	and	residential	square	feet	per	unit	retain	their	significant	
effects.		Commercial	square	footage	retains	it	positive	and	significant	impact	on	costs,	with	
1,000	square	feet	of	commercial	space	increasing	costs	by	roughly	5%	per	unit.		Underground	
parking	and	year	funded	also	maintain	positive	and	significant	coefficients.	
Among	demographic	variables,	average	affordability	and	senior	projects	retain	their	statistical	
influence	on	cost,	with	projects	for	seniors	registering	per	unit	total	development	costs	at	11-
12%	lower	than	the	baseline	group,	projects	for	At-Risk	populations.				
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Table	8:	Spatial	Lag	Model	Results	
		 Baseline	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4	 Model	5	 Model	7	 Model	8	 Model	9	
Intercept	 -44.396***	 -42.647***	 -43.848***	 -43.668***	 -43.456***	 -44.396***	 -47.01***	 -43.973***	 -44.862***	
Prevailing	Wage	Required	 0.153***	 0.15***	 0.15***	 0.152***	 0.154***	 0.153***	 0.152***	 0.15***	 -0.155***	
Total	Units	 -0.177***	 -0.182***	 -0.183***	 -0.18***	 -0.176***	 -0.177***	 -0.19***	 -0.184***	 -0.155***	
Residential	Square	Feet	Per	Unit	 0.015**	 0.015**	 0.015**	 0.015**	 0.015**	 0.015**	 0.016**	 0.016**	 0.015**	
Common	Area	Square	Feet	 0.002*	 0.002*	 0.002*	 0.002*	 0.002*	 0.002*	 0.001^	 0.002*	 0.001*	
Commercial	Square	Feet	 0.058**	 0.059**	 0.055**	 0.059**	 0.058**	 0.058**	 0.048*	 0.053**	 0.058**	
Project	Has	Elevator	 0.027	 0.023	 0.025	 0.024	 0.025	 0.027	 0.032^	 0.032^	 0.03^	
Year	Funded	 0.027***	 0.026***	 0.027***	 0.027***	 0.027***	 0.027***	 0.028***	 0.027***	 0.028***	
Number	of	Parking	Spaces	 0.017	 0.02	 0.021	 0.019	 0.018	 0.017	 0.028	 0.022	 0.003	
Has	Underground	Parking	 0.057**	 0.051**	 0.053**	 0.053**	 0.057**	 0.057**	 0.046*	 0.046*	 0.056**	
Average	Affordability	 -0.005***	 -0.005***	 -0.005***	 -0.005***	 -0.005***	 -0.005***	 -0.005***	 -0.005***	 -0.006***	
At-Risk	 -0.149	 -0.147	 -0.177	 -0.147	 -0.155	 -0.149	 -0.102	 -0.152	 -0.134	
Large	Family	 0.035	 0.03	 0.031	 0.03	 0.034	 0.035	 0.049	 0.042	 0.049	
Seniors	 -0.118**	 -0.116**	 -0.115**	 -0.117**	 -0.118**	 -0.118**	 -0.091*	 -0.105*	 -0.12**	
Special	Needs	 -0.048	 -0.047	 -0.049	 -0.048	 -0.05	 -0.048	 -0.026	 -0.038	 -0.046	
SRO	 0.073	 0.066	 0.074	 0.066	 0.071	 0.073	 0.095	 0.07	 0.078	
Within	A	1/3	Mile	of	Rail	Stop	
	
0.047^	
	       Within	Half	Mile	of	Rail	Stop	
	  
0.034	
	      Within	1/4	Mile	of	Rail	Stop	
	   
0.039	
	     Jobs-Housing	Fit	
	    
-0.001	
	    Jobs	45	Minutes	By	Transit	
	     
-0.084	
	   Jobs	45	Minutes	By	Car	
	         Jobs	Housing	Balance	(2.5	Mi.)	
	      
0.029***	
	  Jobs	Housing	Balance	(5	Mi.)	
	       
0.051**	
	In	TOD	Program		
	        
0.029	
Rho	 0.22429	 0.23589	 0.23704	 0.22929	 0.20545	 0.22429	 0.25516^	 0.21441	 0.2275	
LR	Test	p-value	 0.143	 0.1216	 0.120	 0.133	 0.185	 0.146	 0.091	 0.16	 0.134	
AIC	 -246.85	 -248.65	 -247.14	 -247.1	 -246.04	 -246.85	 -256.58	 -252.1	 -258.09	
AIC	for	Linear	Model	 -246.71	 -248.25	 -246.73	 -246.85	 -246.27	 -246.71	 -255.73	 -252.12	 -257.85	
Significance	Levels:	***.001,		**.01,		*.05,	^.1	
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Table	9:	County	Indicators	For	Spatial	Lag	Models	
County	Indicator	Variables	 Baseline	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4	 Model	5	 Model	7	 Model	8	 Model	9	
Contra	Costa	 -0.084	 -0.075	 -0.076	 -0.077	 -0.084	 -0.318*	 -0.087	 -0.081	 -0.076	
El	Dorado	 -0.318*	 -0.301*	 -0.303*	 -0.308*	 -0.325*	 -0.418**	 -0.318*	 -0.309*	 -0.307*	
Imperial	 -0.418**	 -0.399**	 -0.4**	 -0.407**	 -0.435**	 -0.111**	 -0.398**	 -0.428***	 -0.403**	
Los	Angeles	 -0.111**	 -0.1*	 -0.103*	 -0.105*	 -0.115**	 -0.024	 -0.117**	 -0.127**	 -0.111*	
Marin		 -0.024	 -0.01	 -0.014	 -0.016	 -0.025	 -0.2*	 -0.029	 -0.028	 -0.018	
Napa	 -0.2*	 -0.187*	 -0.189*	 -0.192*	 -0.205*	 -0.78***	 -0.202*	 -0.206*	 -0.184*	
Nevada	 -0.78***	 -0.765***	 -0.767***	 -0.771***	 -0.791***	 -0.135**	 -0.81***	 -0.817***	 -0.762***	
Orange	 -0.135**	 -0.12*	 -0.122*	 -0.125*	 -0.128*	 -0.208^	 -0.141**	 -0.153**	 -0.127*	
Placer	 -0.208^	 -0.188	 -0.191	 -0.196	 -0.221^	 -0.252***	 -0.204^	 -0.215^	 -0.197	
Riverside	 -0.252***	 -0.235**	 -0.237**	 -0.242***	 -0.261***	 -0.299***	 -0.236***	 -0.248***	 -0.249***	
Sacramento	 -0.299***	 -0.29**	 -0.288**	 -0.294**	 -0.31***	 -0.098^	 -0.305***	 -0.327***	 -0.284**	
San	Diego	 -0.098^	 -0.091^	 -0.095^	 -0.094^	 -0.102^	 0.281***	 -0.091^	 -0.101*	 -0.086	
San	Francisco	 0.281***	 0.282***	 0.278***	 0.281***	 0.281***	 0.027	 0.279***	 0.255***	 0.289***	
San	Mateo	 0.027	 0.026	 0.026	 0.023	 0.029	 -0.048	 0.036	 0.028	 0.043	
Santa	Clara	 -0.048	 -0.043	 -0.049	 -0.044	 -0.049	 -0.372**	 -0.058	 -0.061	 -0.042	
Solano	 -0.372**	 -0.355**	 -0.358**	 -0.363**	 -0.379**	 -0.179**	 -0.352**	 -0.365**	 -0.358**	
Sonoma	 -0.179**	 -0.164*	 -0.166*	 -0.17**	 -0.185**	 -0.413**	 -0.177**	 -0.182**	 -0.166*	
Sutter	 -0.413**	 -0.396**	 -0.397**	 -0.404**	 -0.425**	 -0.121*	 -0.4**	 -0.406**	 -0.397**	
Ventura	 -0.121*	 -0.105^	 -0.108^	 -0.111*	 -0.123*	 -0.249*	 -0.115*	 -0.12*	 -0.106^	
Yolo	 -0.249*	 -0.229*	 -0.227*	 -0.238*	 -0.261*	 -0.408**	 -0.281*	 -0.281*	 -0.24*	
Yuba	 -0.408**	 -0.391**	 -0.392**	 -0.399**	 -0.42**	 -44.396***	 -0.386**	 -0.404**	 -0.399**	
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Among	our	rail	transit	measures,	the	indicator	for	being	within	a	third	of	a	mile	of	a	rail	stop	is	
weakly	significant	and	shows	an	effect	of	raising	project	costs	by	an	average	of	4.7%.		No	other	
measures	of	transit	proximity	are	significant.		As	with	the	OLS	regressions,	our	jobs-housing	
balance	metrics	are	highly	significant	and	show	a	positive	effect	while	jobs	housing	fit	and	
participation	in	the	TOD	program	show	no	significant	effects.	
	
The	log-likelihood	test	p-values	for	all	nine	models	plus	the	baseline	model	are	insignificant,	
indicating	that	these	model	specifications	have	corrected	the	spatial	autocorrelation.		The	Rho	
values,	which	indicate	the	impact	of	the	spatial	lag,	range	between	.20	and	.26,	but	the	Rho	is	
statistically	significant	in	only	one	case	(Model	7).		Models	7	and	9	also	perform	best	according	
to	the	Akaike	Information	Criteria	(AIC),	despite	participation	in	the	TOD	Program	(Model	9)	
being	statistically	insignificant.			
Geographically	Weighted	Regression	Results	
Our	next	step	was	to	include	the	variables	specified	in	Models	7	and	8	in	our	geographically	
weighted	regression	(GWR)	analysis.	GWR	is	helpful	for	understanding	how	costs	vary	across	
space.	When	using	OLS,	we	assume	that	the	estimated	coefficients	remain	the	same	across	a	
region;	GWR	allows	the	estimated	coefficients	to	vary	within	the	region	(152).		While	promising,	
we	present	these	results	cautiously—what	is	important	here	is	how	the	reported	coefficient	
either	grows	or	shrinks	across	space,	rather	than	what	its	absolute	value	is.		
The	variation	in	coefficient	results	for	Model	7	and	Model	8	are	presented	in	Table	10.	Due	to	
the	increased	importance	of	space	in	calculating	coefficients	in	GWR,	models	can	be	easily	over-
specified	if	too	many	spatially	auto-correlated	variables	are	included.		The	inclusion	of	sets	of	
indicator	variables	representing	different	groups,	like	populations	served,	can	also	present	
problems	for	this	approach.		Thus,	the	models	in	this	subsection	only	retain	the	variables	from	
previously	presented	models	that	do	not	introduce	these	complications.	
As	coefficients	vary	across	space	in	GWR,	Table	10	presents	summary	statistics	for	each	of	the	
coefficients	in	the	model.		The	“Global”	column	on	the	far	right	end	of	Table	10	is	the	overall	
coefficient	for	the	variable	for	the	region	as	a	whole.	The	estimated	coefficients	for	jobs-
housing	balance	within	a	2.5	mile	radius	of	a	project	are	positive	when	measured	at	80%	of	the	
observations.		Surprisingly,	average	affordability	is	also	measured	as	having	a	positive	effect	at	
nearly	a	quarter	of	the	observations.		At	over	a	quarter	of	the	locations	in	the	sample,	
commercial	square	footage	registers	a	negative	coefficient.	The	effect	of	the	prevailing	wage	is	
uniformly	positive,	but	the	effect	differs	spatially,	with	the	maximum	effect	over	100%	greater	
than	the	minimum.			
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Table	10:	Geographically	Weighted	Regression	For	Model	7,	Job-Housing	Balance	(2.5	Mile	
Buffer)	
		 Minimum	 1st	Quantile	 Median	
3rd	
Quantile	 Max	 Global	
Model	7	
Intercept	 -119.7	 -103.6	 -39.79	 -28.8	 -19.38	 -58.924	
Log	Total	Units	 -0.293	 -0.242	 -0.217	 -0.148	 -0.068	 -0.182	
Has	Prevailing	Wage	 0.109	 0.153	 0.179	 0.217	 0.263	 0.204	
Average	Affordability	 -0.014	 -0.006	 -0.002	 0	 0.002	 -0.004	
Residential	Square	Feet	Per	
Unit	 0.009	 0.023	 0.028	 0.038	 0.056	 0.03	
Common	Area	Square	Feet	 0	 0.001	 0.002	 0.003	 0.006	 0.003	
Commercial	Square	Feet	 -0.109	 -0.022	 0.029	 0.067	 0.086	 0.054	
Year	 0.016	 0.021	 0.026	 0.058	 0.066	 0.036	
Log	Parking	Spaces	 -0.04	 0.005	 0.031	 0.049	 0.1	 0.005	
Underground	Parking	 -0.019	 0.058	 0.075	 0.1	 0.3	 0.125	
Jobs-Housing	Balance	(2.5	
Miles)	 -0.015	 0.005	 0.031	 0.036	 0.086	 0.022	
Model	8	
Intercept	 -65.09	 -64.86	 -33.57	 -30.16	 -29.71	
-
56.0425	
Log	Total	Units	 -0.252	 -0.251	 -0.235	 -0.175	 -0.174	 -0.182	
Paid	Prevailing	Wage	 0.158	 0.161	 0.163	 0.205	 0.206	 0.199	
Average	Affordability	 -0.006	 -0.006	 -0.002	 -0.002	 -0.002	 -0.005	
Residential	Square	Feet	Per	
Unit	 0.02	 0.021	 0.023	 0.032	 0.032	 0.031	
Common	Area	Square	Feet	 0.002	 0.002	 0.003	 0.003	 0.003	 0.003	
Commercial	Square	Feet	 0.028	 0.03	 0.031	 0.062	 0.063	 0.056	
Year	 0.021	 0.022	 0.023	 0.039	 0.04	 0.034	
Parking	Spaces	 0.005	 0.006	 0.031	 0.046	 0.047	 0.005	
Underground	Parking	 0.081	 0.082	 0.081	 0.13	 0.132	 0.116	
Jobs-Housing	Balance	(5	
Miles)	 0.058	 0.06	 0.071	 0.072	 0.077	 0.065	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Model	Diagnostics	 Model	7	 Model	8	
	 	 	 	AICc	 -71.24	 -158.71	
	 	 	 	AIC	 -93.19	 -238.29	
	 	 	 	Residual	Sum	of	Squares	 23.19	 15.91	
	 	 	 	Quasi-Global	R^2	 0.4499	 0.622	 		 	 	 	
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We	can	map	the	spatial	variation	the	coefficients	of	these	variables	across	space.	This	helps	us	
to	understand	how	the	importance	of	the	variables	in	impacting	development	costs	varies	cross	
space.		The	importance	in	these	results	is	not	necessarily	the	actual	coefficients	at	different	
points	in	space,	but	their	effects	relative	to	other	regions.	
	
	Figure	25	presents	the	spatial	variation	in	the	effect	of	Jobs-Housing	Balance	within	2.5	miles	of	
sites’	census	tracts.	The	effect	of	jobs-housing	balance	on	housing	costs	(at	a	2.5	mile	buffer)	is	
highest	in	San	Diego	County	and	along	the	fringes	of	Riverside	County	in	the	south.		In	the	
north,	the	effect	is	higher	in	Santa	Clara	County	and	San	Francisco	City,	but	approaches	zero	in	
the	northern	suburbs	of	San	Francisco,	the	East	Bay	in	and	around	Oakland	proper	and	much	of	
the	greater	Sacramento	Area.	All	things	equal,	jobs	housing	balance	increases	the	cost	of	
affordable	housing	production	costs	in	San	Diego,	Santa	Clara	and	San	Francisco	counties,	while	
it	does	not	appear	to	effect	costs	in	Sacramento	and	the	East	Bay.		
	
	
Figure	25:	Spatial	Variation	in	Jobs-Housing	Balance	(2.5	Mile	Buffer)	Coefficient	in	
Geographically	Weighted	Regression	
The	effects	of	commercial	square	footage	are	presented	in	Figure	26.	The	inclusion	of	
commercial	space	in	projects	appears	to	have	a	negative	impact	within	the	Los	Angeles	area,	
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and	registers	the	strongest	positive	effects	in	the	San	Francisco	Bay	Area	and	Sacramento.		
Commercial	square	feet	registers	a	weak	positive	effect	on	housing	costs	in	the	counties	south	
of	Los	Angeles:	Orange,	San	Diego,	Riverside	and	Imperial.		The	negative	effect	in	and	around	
downtown	Los	Angeles	could	mean	that	the	inclusion	of	commercial	space	in	some	projects	
there	enabled	developers	to	secure	better	lending	terms	overall	for	their	projects	if	demand	for	
commercial	space	was	high	there.	
	
	
Figure	26:	Spatial	Variation	in	Commercial	Square	Footage	Coefficient	in	Geographically	
Weighted	Regression		
The	spatial	pattern	in	the	effect	of	average	affordability	is	presented	in	Figure	27.	Recall	that	
the	higher	the	average	affordability,	the	shallower	the	subsidy	that	is	required.		Thus,	in	areas	
where	the	coefficient	is	negative,	deeper	subsidies	are	presumably	increasing	development	
costs	while	a	positive	coefficient	suggests	deep	affordability	there	correlates	with	reduced	
project	costs.		While	this	seems	counter-intuitive,	a	single	SROs	or	senior	project	could	exert	
this	effect	in	an	area.			
Depth	of	affordability	is	raising	costs	most	dramatically	in	Santa	Clara	County,	home	of	Silicon	
Valley,	and	much	of	the	Sacramento	region.		The	effect	of	this	variable	is	closer	to	zero	or	even	
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slightly	positive	San	Francisco,	Alameda	and	Los	Angeles	counties,	despite	these	how	expensive	
comparable	market	rate	units	might	be	in	these	areas.		Deeply	affordable	SROs	and	senior	
projects	may	be	skewing	the	GWR	in	these	areas.		Overall,	these	results	suggest	that	providing	
affordable	housing	for	the	poorest	residents	has	significant	and	strongly	positive	effect	on	
project	costs	in	Sacramento	and	Silicon	Valley.			
	
	
Figure	27:	Spatial	Variation	in	Average	Affordability	Coefficient	in	Geographically	Weighted	
Regression	
The	spatial	variation	in	the	impact	of	the	prevailing	wage	is	presented	in	Figure	28.	The	
prevailing	wage	has	its	largest	effect	on	affordable	housing	development	costs	in	the	San	
Francisco	Bay	Area,	followed	by	the	Greater	Sacramento	region.		There	is	a	cluster	of	projects	
with	high	coefficient	values	in	west	Los	Angeles	County,	and	it	appears	the	effect	of	the	
prevailing	wage	on	housing	costs	is	higher	in	Orange	County.		In	contrast	the	effect	is	lower,	but	
still	positive,	in	south	Los	Angeles	County	as	well	as	San	Diego	County.		The	cost	of	participating	
in	state	programs,	which	mandate	prevailing	wages,	is	thus	higher	for	projects	in	Northern	
California.		This	means	state	dollars	invested	in	Northern	California	are	not	producing	as	many	
housing	units	on	a	per	dollar	basis	relative	to	state	investments	in	housing	in	the	south.			The	
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impact	of	state	dollars,	as	measured	by	units	produced,	is	smallest	in	the	Bay	Area	due	to	this	
requirement.			
	
Figure	28:	Spatial	Variation	in	the	Prevailing	Wage	Coefficient	in	Geographically	Weighted	
Regression	
Finally,	we	present	the	spatial	variation	in	the	impact	of	underground	parking	in	Figure	29.	The	
effect	of	underground	parking	is	highest	in	the	Greater	Sacramento	area	and	in	the	suburbs	
north	of	San	Francisco,	followed	by	the	Bay	Area	proper.		It	may	be	that	because	underground	
parking	is	less	common	in	Sacramento	the	effect	of	the	variable	is	magnified	there	relative	to	
overall	total	development	costs.		Its	effect	is	lowest	in	the	Los	Angeles	area.		Based	on	these	
results,	suburbs	and	communities	in	the	greater	Sacramento	area	in	particular	should	avoid	
zoning	and	regulations	that	force	affordable	developers	to	build	underground	parking.	
	
		
66	
	
Figure	29:	Spatial	Variation	in	the	Underground	Parking	Coefficient	in	Geographically	
Weighted	Regression	
Model	8	performs	less	robustly	under	GWR	than	Model	7,	with	an	AIC	at	-93.19	and	quasi-
global	r-squared	of	only	.45.		The	second	jobs-housing	balance	measure,	which	calculates	jobs-
housing	balance	within	a	five	mile	buffer,	shows	limited	variation	across	space,	with	the	
coefficient	ranging	only	between	0.058	to	0.077	Figure	9.	This	suggests	the	effect	of	improved	
jobs-housing	balance	has	relatively	similar	effects	on	housing	costs	regardless	of	region.		Our	
results	appear	to	also	be	insensitive	to	the	buffer	scale	at	which	we	calculate	the	effect	of	jobs	
housing	balance	on	project	costs.	
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Figure	30:	Spatial	Variation	in	the	Jobs-Housing	Balance	(5	Mile	Buffer)	Coefficient	in	
Geographically	Weighted	Regression	
As	with	the	previous	jobs-housing	balance	metric,	the	impact	of	this	measure	is	highest	in	San	
Diego	County	and	the	Inland	Empire,	and	is	lowest	in	the	San	Francisco	Bay	Area.	The	difference	
between	the	two	jobs-housing	balance	measures	may	be	in	the	nature	of	the	spatial	
concentration	of	jobs	across	these	four	regions.		However,	that	they	show	similar	trends	across	
the	state	lends	confidence	to	our	analysis.	Regardless	of	the	buffer	distance	used	on	jobs-
housing	balance,	policies	pushing	affordable	housing	to	locate	in	jobs	rich	areas	will	have	a	
greater	impact	on	costs	in	more	suburban	counties	like	Riverside	and	San	Diego	than	in	the	Bay	
Area.	
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Comparing	Models’	Effectiveness	
According	to	both	the	Akaike	Information	Criteria	and	residual	sum	of	squares,	traditional	
ordinary	least	squares	(OLS)	with	spatial	indicator	variables	performed	best	for	the	two	models	
we	tested	with	all	three	techniques.		Geographically	weighted	regression	(GWR)	explained	the	
least	amount	of	variability	in	the	data.		These	model	diagnostics	are	presented	in	Table	11.	
Table	11:	Comparing	Spatial	Modeling	Approaches	With	RSS	And	AIC		
	
OLS	
Spatial	
Lag	 GWR	
Model	7	
13.68	 14.71	 15.91	
-272.7	 -256.58	 -238.29	
Model	8	
13.82	 14.85	 23.19	
-267.7	 -252.1	 -93.19	
	
These	findings	corroborate	the	conclusions	of	others	who	have	examined	the	relative	
effectiveness	of	spatial	approaches	in	modeling	housing	markets	(151).		Whether	we	choose	
the	more	efficient	but	biased	OLS	(due	to	spatial	autocorrelation),	or	the	unbiased	but	less	
efficient	spatial	lag	approach,	the	key	independent	variables	of	interest	yield	coefficients	with	
the	same	signs	and	significance	levels,	inspiring	confidence	in	the	robustness	of	the	findings.		
Conclusions	
We	do	not	find	that	the	state’s	focus	of	prioritizing	affordable	housing	integration	with	rail	
transit	and	job	access	is	increasing	the	costs	of	providing	affordable	housing.		None	of	our	
measures	of	rail	transit	or	job	access	significantly	affect	development	costs	(per	unit),	with	the	
exception	of	jobs-housing	balance.		A	one	unit	increase	in	the	jobs-housing	balance	within	2.5	
miles	of	a	project’s	census	tract	increases	development	costs	by	2.9%,	while	a	one	unit	increase	
in	the	jobs-housing	balance	within	5	miles	of	a	project	increases	development	costs	by	over	5%.		
The	magnitude	of	these	effects	is	greater	in	southern	California,	particularly	in	San	Diego	
County.		Within	northern	California,	the	effects	are	greatest	in	Santa	Clara	County	(Silicon	
Valley).		These	results	are	intuitive,	as	jobs	growth	has	been	identified	as	a	primary	driver	of	
increasing	housing	costs	in	that	region	(153).		But	these	results	should	not	bring	dismay,	that	
moving	from	a	community	with	one	job	per	housing	unit	to	two	jobs	per	housing	unit	will,	on	
average,	increase	costs	at	or	under	5%	is	a	small	price	for	a	dramatic	increase	in	job	
accessibility.		
Our	cost	models	confirm	previous	analysis	that	suggests	economies	of	scale	exist	in	affordable	
housing	development:	as	the	number	of	units	rises,	per	unit	cost	declines.		We	find	that	
including	commercial	space	on	sites	increases	costs,	although	this	effect	is	weaker	or	
potentially	reversed	in	and	around	downtown	and	west	Los	Angeles.	We	find	that	adhering	to	
prevailing	wage	laws	increases	development	costs	by	15%	on	average,	with	the	effect	higher	in	
the	San	Francisco	Bay	Area	and	lower	in	Southern	California.		Underground	parking	significantly	
increases	costs	as	well.		
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We	found	a	very	thin	body	of	research	estimating	the	drivers	of	affordable	housing	project	
costs.		Given	the	volume	of	tax	dollars	expended	on	supply	side	affordable	housing	construction	
programs,	additional	research	should	refine	and	expand	on	the	models	presented	here	and	
elsewhere	in	the	literature.		This	analysis	should	focus	on	the	role	of	regulatory	requirements	
and	incentives	placed	on	competitively	allocated	subsidies	for	affordable	housing	including	and	
beyond	the	prevailing	wage	and	locational	impacts	measured	here.			
Limitations	
We	preferred	to	include	some	sort	of	indexed	variable	of	minimum	parking	requirements	for	
sites,	in	line	with	the	literature	(102).		However,	in	the	TCAC	applications	many	applicants	listed	
the	total	number	of	parking	spaces	provided	instead	of	the	minimum	parking	requirements	
despite	clear	instructions	requiring	the	regulatory	information.		As	a	result,	we	could	only	use	
the	total	number	of	parking	spaces	required,	although	we	found	this	variable	to	be	strongly	co-
linear	with	the	total	number	of	units	(correlation	.71),	making	us	uncertain	it	would	produce	
significant	results.		We	were	also	unable	to	identify	projects’	actual	heights	or	identify	any	
variables	on	material	quality,	which	have	been	found	to	have	a	significant	and	positive	effects	
on	project	costs	(21,	22).			
Conclusions	
This	report	offers	new	insights	on	the	performance	of	affordable	housing	policies	and	programs	
that	are	designed	to	move	sustainable	transportation	goals	forward.		It	is	crucial	that	federal,	
state	and	regional	policies	are	coordinated	to	address	the	spatial	imbalances	between	the	
locations	of	jobs	and	housing,	as	this	will	lessen	residents’	commute	burdens	and	vehicle	miles	
of	travel	(1,	2).		While	challenges	remain,	the	promise	of	California’s	SB	375	to	improve	regional	
commute	and	housing	cost	outcomes	is	largely	validated	by	this	research,	assuming	the	
requisite	policy	recommendations	are	in	place.			 	
The	re-scaling	of	housing	voucher	thresholds	holds	the	potential	to	dramatically	improve	the	
landscape	for	voucher	recipients,	increasing	the	number	of	units	they	can	afford	to	access	in	
jobs	and	transit	rich	communities.		But	this	comes	at	a	clear	cost:	a	reduction	in	overall	units	
accessible	to	voucher	holders,	and	dramatic	losses	of	voucher	access	in	neighborhoods	
currently	affordable	to	voucher	holders.		This	analysis	will	prove	valuable	to	the	Department	of	
Housing	and	Urban	Development,	local	public	housing	authorities,	local	governments	and	local	
advocacy	organizations	all	concerned	with	optimizing	the	effectiveness	of	housing	voucher	
programs.		Additional	analysis	should	explore	how	this	policy	change	may	affect	one	other	
aspect	of	voucher	recipients	housing	experience:	namely	the	ability	to	access	higher	quality	
units.		
Affordable	housing	proximate	to	rail	does	not	show	signs	of	being	systematically	more	
expensive	than	other	projects,	offering	hope	that	further	integration	of	housing	and	
transportation	planning	may	not	be	as	expensive	as	the	literature	sometimes	suggests.		We	also	
showed	in	Chapter	4	that	other	policy	factors	may	actually	be	more	pronounced	in	driving	
affordable	housing	costs	upward,	like	mandatory	common	areas,	parking	requirements	and	
prevailing	wage	requirements.	Affordable	housing	developers,	financiers	and	agencies,	both	in	
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and	outside	of	California,	can	benefit	from	this	research,	which	will	hopefully	inspire	other	
more	detailed	examinations	of	affordable	housing	development	cost	trends.		
While	the	results	of	this	report	are	promising,	caution	is	warranted.		Professionals	in	the	field	of	
affordable	housing	have	described	the	policy	process	in	California	like	“a	Christmas	Tree”	or	
“the	center	of	the	spokes	on	a	bicycle”	anecdotally	when	providing	feedback	on	this	report.		
What	they	mean	is	that	for	new	housing	funding	to	be	approved	in	California,	it	must	always	
intersect	with	the	interests	of	other	political	coalitions	concerned	with	transit,	food	access,	air	
quality,	solar	power,	education,	public	health,	racial	justice	or	immigrants’	rights,	to	name	just	a	
few.		In	the	coalition	building	process,	the	focus	on	simply	providing	adequate,	affordable	and	
available	housing	can	be	lost.		This	can	mean	costs	rise	and	funding	does	not	create	as	many	
roofs	over	the	heads	of	those	in	need	as	it	could.		The	significance	of	these	results	and	the	
promise	they	offer	for	integrating	affordable	housing	with	sustainable	transportation	do	not	
undermine	in	any	way,	the	fact	the	primary	purpose	of	the	programs	studied	here	are	to	house	
people	who	would	otherwise	be	severely	rent	burdened	or	homeless.				
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